A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.03.001

Cited by 26 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This section builds on prior work by Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010) and Wasser (2013a). Existence is shown first for the ε-constrained contest, for ε > 0, in which each player i = 1, .…”

Section: Existencementioning

confidence: 98%

Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

Ewerhart¹

2014

Economics Letters

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“…This section builds on prior work by Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010) and Wasser (2013a). Existence is shown first for the ε-constrained contest, for ε > 0, in which each player i = 1, .…”

Section: Existencementioning

confidence: 98%

Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

Ewerhart¹

2014

Economics Letters

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“… 2017 ). For contests with incomplete information, however, be it with one-sided incomplete information and continuous types (Hurley and Shogren 1998a ), discrete type spaces (Hurley and Shogren 1998b ; Malueg and Yates 2004 ; Schoonbeek and Winkel 2006 ), a continuously distributed common valuation (Harstad 1995 ; Wärneryd 2003 , 2012 ; Rentschler 2009 ), continuously and independently distributed marginal costs (Fey 2008 ; Ryvkin 2010 ; Wasser 2013a ), or continuously distributed interdependent valuations (Wasser 2013b ), the results have been overall somewhat less comprehensive.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This point has been noted for contests with complete information (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992 ; Nti 1999 ; Cornes and Hartley 2005 ) and for contests with incomplete information and discrete types (Malueg and Yates 2004 ). For continuous types and continuous technologies, convexity assumptions may even be dropped entirely (Wasser 2013b ). However, it is also known that, in general, marginal conditions may fail to identify a PSNE in a contest because global second-order conditions need not hold.…”

Section: Existencementioning

confidence: 99%

Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Ewerhart

Quartieri

2019

Econ Theory

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Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up with a positive net rent. Keywords Imperfectly discriminating contests • Private information • Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium • Budget constraints • Rent dissipation JEL Classification C72 • D23 • D72 • D82 This paper was drafted while the second-named author was visiting the University of Zurich in spring 2013. Two anonymous reviewers and a Co-Editor provided extremely valuable comments. For useful discussions, we would like to thank

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“…Wärneryd (2003Wärneryd ( , 2009) assume a common value of winning. Existence proofs as well as comparative statics (e.g., with respect to rent dissipation and aggregate effort) have been provided by Fey (2008), Prada-Sarmiento (2010), Ryvkin (2010), and Wasser (2010, 2013. Ko (2012) works backwards from the equilibrium distribution of efforts in order to shed light on the solution.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%