A note on Stackelberg competition

Julien, Ludovic A.

doi:10.1007/s00712-010-0187-3

Cited by 22 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…So, when all atoms have the same endowments and preferences, their market powers are equal, which implies that their (Cournotian) equilibrium strategies are identical. Our proposition extends a result obtained in partial equilibrium by Julien [17] to cover a general equilibrium framework. In addition, it spreads the result obtained in Julien [16] to cover mixed markets exchange in which all traders behave strategically.…”

Section: Equivalence Between the Sce And The Cesupporting

confidence: 80%

Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

Julien¹

2012

TEL

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In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide <i>if and only if</i> the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE

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Section: Equivalence Between the Sce And The Cesupporting

confidence: 80%

Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

Julien¹

2012

TEL

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“…(2) when one firm adopts the innovation strategy and another adopts the imitation strategy, it means that there is an orderly competition in production and they carry out a Stackelberg game [66]; and (3) when two firms adopt an imitation strategy, they carry out a Cournot game without the R&D investment. e payoffs from the different situations are presented as below.…”

Section: E Basic Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

et al. 2021

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To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

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“…Second, Stackelberg competition among the insiders increases the amount of information revealed in the stock price compared to the Cournot case. To understand this result better, recall the expression of the total order flow signal,r = β + γz +ũ, (19) where the noise termũ, in the total order flow signal is homoscedastic 10 (see equation 19). Hence, the greater the deterministic part γ of the total order flow signal, the more informative is the total order flow signal.…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Insider trading with different market structures

Daher

Karam

Mirman

2012

International Review of Economics & Finance

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We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures: (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) Monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by each of the market structure. Finally we perform a comparative statics analysis between the models. 1

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A note on Stackelberg competition

Abstract: Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, Reaction functions, Market demand functions, Strategic complementarities, D43, L13, L20,

Cited by 22 publications

References 18 publications

Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

Insider trading with different market structures

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