A note on Stackelberg games

Nie, Pu‐yan; Zhang, Pei-ai

doi:10.1109/ccdc.2008.4597505

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…One possible explanation perspective is to regard the leader-follower interaction as a game from the game theory. It was demonstrated that the leaders will have advantage role in the interaction game, while if the leader acts like an average play, his/her payoff function value will be reduced (Nie and Zhang, 2008). We, thus, inferred that these ambivalent relationships are endorsement for leaders.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Good or Bad? The Ambivalent Leader-Follower Relationships

Zhao

Zhou

2021

Front. Psychol.

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Researchers have emphasized the positive and negative influences of ambivalent leader-follower relationships, but it is not clear when the ambivalent relationship is associated with good or bad influences. To answer this question, we reviewed the definition and identified 10 different types of ambivalent leader-follower relationships. Further, we demonstrate that the negative outcomes (more inflexibility, disengagement, and worse performance) can be explained by the workplace stressor perspective, and that the positive outcomes (more flexibility, engagement, and better performance) can be explained by paradox view. Finally, drawing from conservation of resources (COR) theory, we integrate workplace stressor framework and the paradox view to address when the ambivalent leader-follower relationship is beneficial or detrimental for followers. We proposed that the degree of ambivalence, support from the third party, and integrative complexity of follower will influence the possible positive or negative influences. Limitations and future directions were also discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Good or Bad? The Ambivalent Leader-Follower Relationships

Zhao

Zhou

2021

Front. Psychol.

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“…The schemes are categorized with respect to the challenges (see Section 4) and on the basis of adopted approaches (e.g., game theoretic approaches and nongame theoretic approaches) to address the challenges. The game theoretic approaches, such as Stackelberg game [21], are used to achieve the equilibrium state (e.g., Nash equilibrium [22]) and it involves PUs and SUs as players of the game. Examples of the nongame theoretic approaches are reinforcement learning [23] and convex optimization [24].…”

Section: Spectrum Leasing Schemes In Cognitive Radio Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

Syed

Yau

2014

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Cognitive Radio (CR) is a dynamic spectrum access approach, in which unlicensed users (or secondary users, SUs) exploit the underutilized channels (or white spaces) owned by the licensed users (or primary users, PUs). Traditionally, SUs are oblivious to PUs, and therefore the acquisition of white spaces is not guaranteed. Hence, a SU must vacate its channel whenever a PU reappears on it in an unpredictable manner, which may affect the SUs' network performance. Spectrum leasing has been proposed to tackle the aforementioned problem through negotiation between the PU and SU networks, which allows the SUs to acquire white spaces for a guaranteed period of time. Through spectrum leasing, the PUs and SUs enhance their network performances, and additionally PUs maximize their respective monetary gains.

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“…The lower priority users are called followers. In a Stackelberg game, the leader declares a strategy first, then the followers rationally react to the leader's action, hence the leader has the ability to enforce his strategy on the followers [14]- [17]. The solution of the Stackelberg game is called Stackelberg equilibrium solution.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Study of Cooperative Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Afghah

Razi

2014

International Journal of Handheld Computing Research

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In this paper, a novel property-right spectrum leasing solution based on Stackelberg game is proposed for Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN), where part of the secondary users present probabilistic dishonest behavior. In this model, the Primary User (PU) as the spectrum owner allows the Secondary User (SU) to access the shared spectrum for a fraction of time in exchange for providing cooperative relaying service by the SU. A reputation based mechanism is proposed that enables the PU to monitor the cooperative behavior of the SUs and restrict its search space at each time slot to the secondary users that do not present dishonest behavior in the proceeding time slots. The proposed reputation-based solution outperforms the classical Stackelberg games from both primary and reliable secondary users' perspectives. This novel method of filtering out unreliable users increases the PU's expected utility over consecutive time slots and also encourages the SUs to follow the game rule.

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A note on Stackelberg games

Cited by 15 publications

References 15 publications

Good or Bad? The Ambivalent Leader-Follower Relationships

Good or Bad? The Ambivalent Leader-Follower Relationships

Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

Game Theoretic Study of Cooperative Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks

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