2020
DOI: 10.1155/2020/8850356
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A Novel Attack-and-Defense Signaling Game for Optimal Deceptive Defense Strategy Choice

Abstract: Increasingly, more administrators (defenders) are using defense strategies with deception such as honeypots to improve the IoT network security in response to attacks. Using game theory, the signaling game is leveraged to describe the confrontation between attacks and defenses. However, the traditional approach focuses only on the defender; the analysis from the attacker side is ignored. Moreover, insufficient analysis has been conducted on the optimal defense strategy with deception when the model is establis… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Still, it is only a single-stage offensive and defensive game research, which does not match the dynamic evolution of network offense and defense. Hu et al [25] improved the previous work and proposed that the signal attenuation factor represents the change of defense signal function in different stages, guiding the selection of optimal strategy for multistage active defense. However, existing research still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the quantification of the benefits of offensive and defensive strategies.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Still, it is only a single-stage offensive and defensive game research, which does not match the dynamic evolution of network offense and defense. Hu et al [25] improved the previous work and proposed that the signal attenuation factor represents the change of defense signal function in different stages, guiding the selection of optimal strategy for multistage active defense. However, existing research still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the quantification of the benefits of offensive and defensive strategies.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dingkun Yu et al (2015) divided the attack-defense sides into different types. A static Bayes based attack-defense game model was established to analyze the equilibrium and solve the problem that the behaviors of attack-defense are unknown to each other in reality [14]; 4) Research on the dynamic Game based on incomplete information [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. In view of the reality that the actions of invaders rely on network detection, Yongjin constructed a multi-stage network game model and designed an optimal network defense strategy selection algorithm combining non-cooperative game theory [16].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A static Bayes based attack-defense game model was established to analyze the equilibrium and solve the problem that the behaviors of attack-defense are unknown to each other in reality [14]; 4) Research on the dynamic Game based on incomplete information [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. In view of the reality that the actions of invaders rely on network detection, Yongjin constructed a multi-stage network game model and designed an optimal network defense strategy selection algorithm combining non-cooperative game theory [16]. Yang Yu et al (2019) proposed a network attack-defense game model based on multi-level asymmetric information of the Internet of Things system to determine an optimal defense strategy [18].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%