A Novel Navigation Message Authentication Scheme for GNSS Open Service

Caparra, Gianluca; Sturaro, Silvia; Laurenti, Nicola; Wullems, Christian; Ioannides, Rigas

doi:10.33012/2016.14692

Cited by 22 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Data level protection can be achieved with information security techniques usually referred to as Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) [2]- [5], which foresee the use of cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the navigation message.…”

Section: Background On Gnss Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, the resiliency of positioning, navigation and timing has received significant attention due to an increasing awareness of spoofing threats and the vulnerability of the current GNSS to this type of deliberate interference [1]. A significant body of research has focused on cryptographic techniques to defend against spoofing, both at data (symbol) [2]- [5] and signal layers (spreading code) [6]- [8]. Such techniques focus on providing the capability for authenticating the origin of the navigation message and providing assurance on the authenticity of ranging signals through methods such as spreading code encryption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An autonomous GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Caparra

Wullems

Ioannides

2016

2016 8th ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals and Signal Processing (NAVITEC

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In recent years, the problem of Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) resiliency has received significant attention due to an increasing awareness on threats and the vulnerability of the current GNSS signals. Several proposed solutions make uses of cryptography to protect against spoofing. A limitation of cryptographic techniques is that they introduce a communication and processing computation overhead and may impact the performance in terms of availability and continuity for GNSS users. This paper introduces autonomous non cryptographic antispoofing mechanisms, that exploit semi-codeless receiver techniques to detect spoofing for signals with a component making use of spreading code encryption

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Section: Background On Gnss Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An autonomous GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Caparra

Wullems

Ioannides

2016

2016 8th ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals and Signal Processing (NAVITEC

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“…Encryption Techniques: In [25,26], novel navigation message authentication schemes for the GNSS signals are given. The technique proposed in [25] combines two authentications of GPS, namely cryptographic authentication and signal timing authentication based on statistical hypothesis tests.…”

Section: Introduction To Gnssmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Layer Security Issues in Massive MIMO and GNSS

Gülgün

2021

Linköping Studies in Science and Technology. Licentiate Thesis

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“…Moreover, the clock drift can indicate of an attack [11], [13], [14]: monitoring clock variations with an advanced oscillator limits the extent of adversarial manipulation. Other approaches propose countering spoofing attacks with cryptographic methods [4], [8], [19], because the spoofers cannot forge the GNSS signals without knowing the corresponding cryptographic keys. However, this requires upgrading the current satellite systems and receivers hardware; for instance, current civilian GPS receivers do not support cryptographic protection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Effects of Distance-decreasing Attacks on Cryptographically Protected GNSS Signals

Zhang¹,

Papadimitratos²

2019

The International Technical Meeting of the the Institute of Navigation

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The security of global navigation satellite systems draws attention increasingly, and authentication mechanisms for civilian services seem very effective in thwarting malicious behavior. For example, the Galileo E1 Open Service introduces navigation message authentication. Authentication, as well as encryption at navigation message or spreading code level, can prevent spoofing attacks, but do not preclude replay attacks. In this work, we consider a type of strong replay attacks, distance-decreasing attacks, against cryptographically protected GNSS signals. Distance-decreasing attack enhance an attacker's capability of allowing it to mislead the victim receiver that the GNSS signals arrive earlier than true signals. We analyze the instantiation and the effects of the distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected GNSS signals, on navigation message authenticated signals, and on spreading-code encrypted signals. We discuss different strategies that the attacker can adopt to introduce the least bit errors to the re-transmitted signals and avoid being detected at the victim receiver. We provide evaluation results of distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected signals and authenticated navigation message signals, based on different strategies and configurations, and we sketch countermeasures to the different strategies.

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A Novel Navigation Message Authentication Scheme for GNSS Open Service

Cited by 22 publications

References 6 publications

An autonomous GNSS anti-spoofing technique

An autonomous GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Physical Layer Security Issues in Massive MIMO and GNSS

On the Effects of Distance-decreasing Attacks on Cryptographically Protected GNSS Signals

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