A Novel Ratio-Phase Metric of Signal Quality Monitoring for Real-Time Detection of GPS Interference

Farhadi, A.; Moazedi, M.; Mosavi, Mohammad Reza; Sadr, Ali

doi:10.1007/s11277-017-4635-z

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 6 publications

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“…• Methods that use the signal quality monitoring mechanism to measure the distortion in the auto-correlation function of the received signal and detect the spoofer [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]. The paper [12] studies the applicability of multi-path mitigation techniques for anti-spoofing purposes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Kalantari

Larsson

2020

EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process.

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are being the target of various jamming, spoofing, and meaconing attacks. This paper proposes a new statistical test for the presence of multiple spoofers based on range measurements observed by a plurality of receivers located on a rigid body platform. The relative positions of the receivers are known, but the location and orientation of the platform are unknown. The test is based on the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) paradigm and essentially performs a consistency check between the set of observed range measurements and known information about the satellite topology and the geometry of the receiver constellation. Optimal spoofing locations and optimal artificial time delays (as induced by the spoofers) are also determined. Exact evaluation of the GLRT requires the maximum-likelihood estimates of all parameters, which proves difficult. Instead, approximations based on iterative algorithms and the squared-range least squares algorithm are derived. The accuracy of these approximations is benchmarked against Cramér-Rao lower bounds. Numerical examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and show that increasing the number of GNSS receivers makes the attack easier to detect. We also show that using multiple GNSS receivers limits the availability of optimal attack positions.

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