A novel single-principal-multiple-agent repeated game model and solution method for performance assurance of emergency supplies

PurposeThe purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze the dynamics of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, particularly, focusing on profit-driven speculative behaviors exhibited by enterprises within this context. The study aims to understand the various factors influencing the behavior of stakeholders involved in grain storage, including government storage departments, agent storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate profit-driven behaviors in government-enterprise grain joint storage. It analyzes strategies of government departments, storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies, considering factors like supervision costs and speculative risks. Simulation analysis examines tripartite payoffs, initial probabilities and the impact of digital governance levels to enhance emergency grain storage effectiveness.FindingsThe study finds that leveraging digital governance tools in government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanisms can mitigate risks, enhance efficiency and ensure the security of grain storage. It highlights the significant impact of supervision costs, speculative risks and digital supervision levels on stakeholder strategies, offering guidance to improve the effectiveness of emergency grain storage systems.Originality/valueThe originality of this study lies in its integration of digital governance tools into the analysis of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, addressing profit-driven speculative behaviors. Through a tripartite evolutionary game model, it explores stakeholder strategies, emphasizing the impact of digital supervision levels on outcomes and offering insights crucial for enhancing emergency grain storage effectiveness.

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A novel single-principal-multiple-agent repeated game model and solution method for performance assurance of emergency supplies

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

Government incentive contract design for carbon reduction innovation considering market value under asymmetric information

Government incentive contract design for carbon reduction innovation considering market value under asymmetric information

Cumulative prospect theory under different types of input data for public health resilience assessment during natural disasters

Grain storage security in context of government digital governance: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis of speculative behavior

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