A numerical method to determine a degressive proportional distribution of seats in the European Parliament

Florek, Jan

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.07.003

Cited by 16 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Methods based on parabolic allocation functions, power allocation functions, piecewise linear allocation functions and other are constructed in this part (Dniestrzański, 2014a(Dniestrzański, , 2014bGrimmet et al, 2012;Haman, 2007;Martinez-Aroza & Ramirez-Gonzalez, 2008;Pukelsheim, 2010;Ramirez-Gonzalez, 2012;Ramírez-González et al, 2006. The second group is formed by proposals of divisions generated using numerical methods (Florek, 2012;Serafini, 2012).…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

et al. 2021

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One of the main problems of practical applications of degressively proportional allocations of goods and burdens is lack of uniqueness of this principle. Even under given boundary conditions of allocation, i.e. determined minimal and maximal amounts of a good that can be assigned in a given allocation, there are usually many feasible solutions. The lack of formal rules of allocation is the reason why the allocation is typically a result of negotiations among its agents. A number of allocations favor some of agents or their groups, therefore other agents cannot accept them. The aim of this paper is to indicate a way of reducing the set of all feasible solutions exclusively to those that are neutral to all agents. As a result of the term of lexicographic preference of allocation agents defined on the basis of the relation theory followed by a numerical analysis of sets of all feasible solutions, it is possible to determine a core of this set in the form of a subset of all feasible solutions that are acceptable by all agents. In addition, this subset can be further divided into smaller subsets with regard to the degree of acceptance of their elements. Theoretical analysis is complemented by case studies, one of which is application of this idea to the allocation of seats in the European Parliament among the member states of the European Union.

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Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

et al. 2021

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“…Finally, we also contribute to the literature that uses tools from voting environments to solve allocation problems. Examples include, but are not limited to, the apportionment and proportional representation problems (Balinski & Laraki, 2007 ; Brill et al, 2018 ; Florek, 2012 ; Johnston, 1983 ; Jones et al, 2020 ), and the claim problems (Flores‐Szwagrzak, 2015 ; Ju et al, 2007 ). Our study is closely related to the coalition structure model introduced by Aumann and Dreze ( 1974 ), and a recent modeling approach by Martin et al ( 2021 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vaccine and inclusion

Nganmeni¹,

Pongou

Tchantcho

et al. 2022

J Public Economic Theory

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In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a polarized economy facing a pandemic. In such an economy, individuals are organized around distinct networks and groups and have in‐group preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the set of inclusive and popular vaccine allocations. The findings imply that the number of vaccine doses necessary to generate an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation is greater than the one necessary to obtain an allocation that is only popular. The analysis further reveals that it is always possible to design the decision‐making rule of the economy to implement an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation. Under such a rule, the composition of any group endowed with the veto power should necessarily reflect the diversity of the society.

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“…More details about allocation functions can be found in Słomczyn ´ski and _ Zyczkowski (2012). Furthermore, other approaches were studied, e.g., Serafini (2012) applied linear programming, Florek (2012) introduced a numerical method, whereas Dniestrzan ´ski (2014) referred to the multitude of applicable solutions proposing a measure of degressive proportionality. However, none of these methods have been accepted by the Members of the European Parliament.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond the Cambridge Compromise algorithm towards degressively proportional allocations

2017

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Although proportional allocation methods are well-known and widely used in the parliamentary tradition, they cannot be applied in a wide variety of cases. Such problems occur in the European Parliament, where a constitutional principle is to assure that less populous countries will not be dominated by the others, which implies that allocations have to be degressively proportional. However, under this assumption an exhaustive search of the solution space is intractable. To solve the problem, the Cambridge Compromise algorithm was proposed, which is durable, transparent, impartial to politics and unambiguous, but the allocations obtained are not degressively proportional. Therefore, we propose an allocation algorithm derived from operations research that inherits the transparency of the Cambridge Compromise and produces an unambiguous degressively proportional allocation. Hence, the paper aims at testing our alternative allocation method and comparing its outcomes during computational analysis.

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A numerical method to determine a degressive proportional distribution of seats in the European Parliament

Cited by 16 publications

References 5 publications

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents

Vaccine and inclusion

Beyond the Cambridge Compromise algorithm towards degressively proportional allocations

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