A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing About Justice? A Critique of Sen

Valentini, Laura

doi:10.1017/s0266267111000228

Cited by 45 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…However, there are many reasons why Sen's Idea of Justice might not be an effective approach to advance justice as it is presented (e.g. see Deneulin 2011, Pogge and Alvarez 2010, Valentini 2010. Here, I cannot offer a profound analysis of his proposal.…”

Section: The Need and The Insufficiency Of Non-ideal Theories -Sen's mentioning

confidence: 95%

From the Idea of Justice to the Idea of Injustice: Mixing the Ideal, Non-Ideal and Dynamic Conceptions of Injustice

Vazquez

2013

SSRN Journal

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Section: The Need and The Insufficiency Of Non-ideal Theories -Sen's mentioning

confidence: 95%

From the Idea of Justice to the Idea of Injustice: Mixing the Ideal, Non-Ideal and Dynamic Conceptions of Injustice

Vazquez

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…Rawls gladly acknowledged the "pressing and urgent" (Rawls, 1971:9) character of these everyday life issues but argued that without some sort of ideal or transcendental theory of perfect justice, we would be unable to achieve a "systematic grasp of these more pressing problems" (Rawls, 1971:9). This sentiment was partially echoed by Kamm (2011) in her critical review of Sen's position on justice and it was screamed by Valentini (2010) in her strong critique of Sen.…”

Section: A Premise From Theories Of Justicementioning

confidence: 99%

Overcoming constraints imposed by fiduciary duties in terms of justice as a “Leadership Challenge that Matters”

Eccles

2018

ajobe

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This article focuses on the issue of justice as a challenge facing business and society. I advance a simple deductive argument based on two premises. The first emerges out of theories of justice and holds that fairness, as a foundational basis for justice, demands impartiality or the avoidance of bias. The second emerges out of fiduciary law and holds that the duty of loyalty owed by managers to serve the interests of investors is fundamentally partial or biased. The conclusion is the troubling fact that the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by managers to serve the interests of investors appears to be incompatible with the demands of justice. Having presented this, I describe the impartiality tools of Rawls' veil of ignorance and Adam Smith's impartial spectator and discuss how these might be applied in this context. I speculate that while Smith's impartial spectator is absolutely incommensurable with managers' fiduciary duty of loyalty, Rawls' veil of ignorance might be used to imagine a synthesis between this duty of loyalty and the impartiality demands of justice-in theory at least. And finally, as a parting shot, I wonder whether the real "Leadership Challenge that Matters" isn't the gap between theory and reality. Justice … is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, the fabric which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms.

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“…: 16), and because alternative scenarios may differ along different dimensions. While Sen's critique of transcendental approaches might be overdrawn (Gilabert 2012;Thomas 2013;Valentini 2011), the general point stands: in and of itself, the sort of guidance provided by descriptions of ideal states of affairs is often an inadequate guide to political judgment. Cohen may retort that judgment on specific states of affairs is a matter for rules of regulation, not for the normatively ultimate theory of justice.…”

Section: Intuitions Principles Political Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics

Rossi

2015

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts (e.g. about feasibility, human nature, and so on). Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy's traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. Keywords Facts and principles . Moral intuitions . Ideology . Method in political philosophy . G.A. Cohen . Political realism and moralism Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it-all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary-but love it. (Nietzsche) IntroductoryWhat should be the relationship between our factual understanding of the world and our normative theorising about it? G. A. Cohen (2003A. Cohen ( , 2008 has argued that if a normative principle is fact-sensitive, i.e. it relies on a factual claim for its justification, then that factual

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A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing About Justice? A Critique of Sen

Cited by 45 publications

References 19 publications

From the Idea of Justice to the Idea of Injustice: Mixing the Ideal, Non-Ideal and Dynamic Conceptions of Injustice

From the Idea of Justice to the Idea of Injustice: Mixing the Ideal, Non-Ideal and Dynamic Conceptions of Injustice

Overcoming constraints imposed by fiduciary duties in terms of justice as a “Leadership Challenge that Matters”

Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics

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