“…Tools such as simulation-optimisation (Barlow et al, 2003;Young, 1983, 1970;Morel Seytoux, 1975;Raul and Panda, 2013;Sedki and Ouazar, 2011;Young and Bredehoeft, 1972), evolutionary algorithms (BabbarSebens andMinsker, 2010, 2012;McKinney and Lin, 1994;Mirghani et al, 2009), econometric models (Brozovic et al, 2010;Katic and Grafton, 2012;Wan et al, 2012), game theory (Negri, 1989;Raquel et al, 2007;Saak and Peterson, 2007), and Bayesian networks (Henriksen and Barlebo, 2008;Henriksen et al, 2007;Portoghese et al, 2013) focus on equilibrium states (e.g., a global optimum, a Nash equilibrium), and describe social processes in an aggregate manner (e.g., using an optimisation function, a differential equation, a payoff matrix, etc.) based on the concept of a 'typical' agent assumed to be on average rational i.e.…”