A Peircean account of concepts: grounding abstraction in phylogeny through a comparative neuroscientific perspective

Abstract

The nature of concepts has always been a hotly debated topic in both philosophy and psychology and, more recently, also in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts have been proposed of what concepts are. These accounts reflect deeply different conceptions of how the human mind works. In the last decades, two diametrically opposed theories of human cognition have been discussed and empirically investigated: the Computational Theory of Mind, on the one hand (Fodor 1983 ; Pylyshyn 1984), and Embodied Cognition (Barsalou 2008 , 617-645. (doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639); Gallese& Lakoff 2005 , 455-479 (doi:10.1080/02643290442000310); Shapiro 2011), on the other hand. The former proposes that concepts are abstract and amodal symbols in the language of thought, while the latter argues for the embodied nature of concepts that are conceived of as grounded in actions and perception. The embodiment of both concrete and abstract concepts has been challenged by many (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza 2008 , 59-70. (doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004); Caramazza 2014 , 1-15. (doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013950)). These challenges will be here taken seriously and addressed from a comparative perspective. We will provide a phylogenetic and neurobiologically inspired account of the embodied nature of both abstract and concrete concepts. We will propose that, although differing in certain respect, they both might have a bodily foundation. Commonalities between abstract and concrete concepts will be explained by recurring to the Peircean notions of and (CP 2.247). According to Peirce, icons are the kind of signs on which abductive inferences rest (Peirce CS 1931 in Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW. (eds), 40; Peirce CS 1997 In The 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism (ed. A. Turrisi)). It will be claimed that the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese& Sinigaglia 2011 , 512-519. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003)) can be described as an (Cuccio V & Caruana F. 2015 Il corpo come icona. Abduzione, strumenti ed Embodied Simulation. Versus, n. 119, 93-103), and it will then be suggested that on these, basic natural signs rest, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the capacity to conceptualize.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

Abstract, emotional and concrete concepts and the activation of mouth-hand effectors

“…The second novelty in current literature on abstract concepts is the emergence of multiple representation views (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Cuccio & Gallese, 2018; Dove, 2009; Dove, 2011; Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018; Kousta et al, 2011; Newcombe et al, 2012; Prinz, 2012; Recchia & Jones, 2012). These views represent an extension of grounded ones.…”

Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain

“…One paper [22] addresses grounding and embodiment of abstract concepts from a comparative and phylogenetic point of view, another one [23] demonstrates the role and integration of sensorimotor and linguistic experience selecting a special case, that of the concept of causation. Two experimental papers [24,25] demonstrate grounding of concepts of gender, number and time, one paper [26] overviews current computational and robotics studies on grounding of abstract concepts, and finally one paper [27] provides a critical perspective on possible limitations of a grounded approach.…”

“…Two experimental papers [24,25] demonstrate grounding of concepts of gender, number and time, one paper [26] overviews current computational and robotics studies on grounding of abstract concepts, and finally one paper [27] provides a critical perspective on possible limitations of a grounded approach. Cuccio and Gallese [22] develop an embodied view on abstract concepts, contrasting it with the so-called Computational and Representational Theory of Mind. In presenting their approach, they start from a comparative phylogenetic perspective.…”

“…At the same time, concrete and abstract concepts might have differences in acquisition and representation. Cuccio and Gallese [22] propose that the Peircean notion of icon and abduction can provide the tools to understand the mechanisms underlying embodied simulation with both concrete and abstract concepts.…”

“…Future research will need to convincingly highlight the main dimensions that characterize abstract concepts (linguistic, social, emotional) and to verify whether these dimensions assume different values for different kinds of abstract concepts. In our theme issue we have included a section on grounding of abstract concepts in perception and action systems [22][23][24][25][26][27] and two sections focusing on the roles of the inner experience (situatedness in inner processes [28], interoception [29] and metacognition [30]) and of the linguistic and social experience in grounding abstract concepts [31][32][33][34][35].…”