A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager

Abstract

Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that the evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Pascal's wager is the idea that one ought to believe in God for practical reasons, because of what one can gain if theism is true and what one has to lose if theism is false. In this paper, I argue that if epistemic permissivism is true, then the defender of Pascal's wager has powerful responses to two prominent objections. First, I argue that if permissivism is true, then permissivism is true about theistic belief. Second, I show how epistemic permissivism about theistic belief dispels two objections to Pascal's wager: the objection that wagering is impossible, and the objection that wagering is epistemically impermissible.

My religion preaches ‘p’, but I don't believe thatp: Moore's Paradox in religious assertions

“…This claim may also be seen as supportive of epistemic permissivism (i.e., the thesis that a given body of evidence may permit two mutually incompatible attitudes toward a proposition) in religious contexts. For an elaboration of this view, see Jackson (2023).…”

Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence

“…If permissivism is true, however, and I find myself in a permissive case with respect to some proposition, such that two rational doxastic attitudes are rationally "live" for me at once, it is much less clear that the standard arguments for doxastic involuntarism are successful. 11 Finally, others have argued that permissivism has notable implications for debates in epistemology involving pragmatic and moral encroachment (Quanbeck and Worship forthcoming) and practical reasons for belief (Jackson 2023). While we don't have space to fill out all the connections in detail here, we simply note that permissivism has key implications for debates in both epistemology and philosophy of mind.…”

Pragmatic Arguments for Theism

“…6 For responses to many objections to the wager, including objections concerning many gods, mixed strategies, impossibility, irrationality, infinite number of religions, bet-hedging, Pascal's mugging, the problem of hell, temporal discounting, and transformative experiences, see Jackson and Rogers (2019). For a response to the worry that taking Pascal's wager involves poor motives, see Jackson (2023). 7 Thanks to Amanda Askell for discussion of these objections and potential responses.…”