A Philosophy of Evidence Law

Ho, H. L.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228300.001.0001

Cited by 105 publications

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“…Cf. Ho (2008) ch. 4, arguing that a standard of proof, rather than representing a decisional threshold, requires that the fact finder adopt caution as a deliberative attitude.…”

Section: Reasoning Beyond Reasonable Doubtmentioning

confidence: 99%

The threshold lies in the method

Picinali

2015

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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The last few decades have seen several scholars and courts striving to understand the meaning of the reasonable doubt standard and, in particular, to produce instructions that would enlighten jurors in this regard. The focus has been on defining the standard as a threshold indicating the quality and quantity of evidence sufficient for a finding of fact, or the degree of confidence that the fact finder should have before convicting. The results of these endeavours have not been satisfactory and nowadays it is still frequent that juries ask the court for clarification on the meaning of the standard. This paper argues that the reasonable doubt standard is better conceived and explained to the jury as requiring a particular method of reasoning, rather than merely a threshold. A direct explanation of the threshold is elusive and potentially encroaches on the fact finder's role. Reference to a method of reasoning instead promises to provide useful directions to the jury which promote compliance with the threshold itself. The paper advances methodological directives inspired by works in philosophy of the mind and virtue epistemology. The paper then concludes with practical recommendations for devising a new instruction on the standard of proof.

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“…Cf. Ho (2008) ch. 4, arguing that a standard of proof, rather than representing a decisional threshold, requires that the fact finder adopt caution as a deliberative attitude.…”

Section: Reasoning Beyond Reasonable Doubtmentioning

confidence: 99%

The threshold lies in the method

Picinali

2015

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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“…La Corte Suprema ha atemperado la soberanía judicial diciendo que "la actividad jurisdiccional considera un componente básico de prudencia en la decisión" 128 , pero al decir esto no parece notar que un estándar de prueba basado en la prudencia solo es viable si el juez respalda sus decisiones en criterios objetivos, como podrían ser la gravedad y las consecuencias que acarrea para una persona el que un hecho sea tenido por cierto en un litigio 129 . Si bien para la Corte Suprema las leyes reguladoras de la prueba y la motivación de los fallos deberían cumplir este rol ("la fundamentación de las sentencias importa para las partes y el tribunal superior, quedar en posición de poder conocer, rebatir, impugnar y revisar, en su caso, las razones que formaron la convicción del juzgador, comprometiendo así aspectos de orden público que no es posible soslayar") 130 , en la práctica no se observa cómo estas herramientas hacen posible "conocer, rebatir, impugnar y revisar" el juicio de hecho.…”

Section: Convicción (Soberanía) Judicialunclassified

¿Cómo se prueba la responsabilidad civil médica en la justicia chilena?

Torres

2014

Rev. derecho (Valdivia)

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En la justicia chilena la responsabilidad civil médica descansa en reglas de entrada y de salida que informan a los litigantes de las cuestiones de hecho que deben ser probadas en cada juicio. Este artículo demuestra que la práctica chilena ha regulado esa prueba al consagrar la soberanía del juez de instancia para decidir los hechos probados y al testimonio médico como la mejor evidencia disponible ante la infracción de un deber de cuidado. La incertidumbre que generan los riesgos terapéuticos ha fomentado el uso judicial de máximas de la experiencia-incluido el res ipsa loquitur-para dirimir los riesgos que cada caso entraña. Esta es una regulación probatoria que se aplica tanto a la responsabilidad que se deriva de un tratamiento (profesionales médicos) como la que se sigue de la organización del servicio de salud (Hospitales y Clínicas).

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“…Some have to do with reasoning methods which are not only evidence-to-hypothesis, but also hypotheses-to-evidence [21,2] and involve inference to the best explanation [6]. A better account, arguably, is one in which the proceedings are seen as an interplay of evidence and various explanations (often called narratives) presented by opposing parties [10].Accordingly, the no plausible alternative story (NPAS) theory [1] is that the courtroom is a confrontation of competing narrations offered by the defendant and by the prosecutor and the narrative to be selected should be the most plausible one. The view is conceptually plausible [7] and finds support in * The research has been funded by Research Foundation Flanders.…”

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Reconciling Bayesian Epistemology and Narration-based Approaches to Judiciary Fact-finding

Urbaniak

2017

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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Legal probabilism (LP) claims the degrees of conviction in juridical fact-finding are to be modeled exactly the way degrees of beliefs are modeled in standard bayesian epistemology. Classical legal probabilism (CLP) adds that the conviction is justified if the credence in guilt given the evidence is above an appropriate guilt probability threshold. The views are challenged on various counts, especially by the proponents of the so-called narrative approach, on which the fact-finders' decision is the result of a dynamic interplay between competing narratives of what happened. I develop a way a bayesian epistemologist can make sense of the narrative approach. I do so by formulating a probabilistic framework for evaluating competing narrations in terms of formal explications of the informal evaluation criteria used in the narrative approach. 1 1 Legal probabilism and its troubles According to legal probabilism (LP), degrees of conviction in juridical fact-finding are to be modeled exactly the way degrees of beliefs are modeled in standard bayesian epistemology: by means of probabilistic distributions satisfying the standard axioms of probability theory. Classical legal probabilism (CLP), which originated with Bernoulli [3] adds on top of that the view according to which the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt should be equated with a certain high threshold probability of guilt (albeit, some variants of the view admit that thresholds for different cases might be different). 2 LP (and generally, the use of probabilistic methods in judiciary contexts) is criticized from various angles (see for example [18], [19], [4], [20], [14], [5], [6], [21], [17], [2], [10], [9]). The critics of LP argue that the view is blind to various phenomena that an adequate philosophical account of legal fact-finding should explain. Some of them pertain to procedural issues [17]: proceedings are back-andforth between opposing parties, cross-examination is crucial, and yet CLP seems to take no notice of this dynamics. Some have to do with reasoning methods which are not only evidence-to-hypothesis, but also hypotheses-to-evidence [21,2] and involve inference to the best explanation [6]. A better account, arguably, is one in which the proceedings are seen as an interplay of evidence and various explanations (often called narratives) presented by opposing parties [10].Accordingly, the no plausible alternative story (NPAS) theory [1] is that the courtroom is a confrontation of competing narrations offered by the defendant and by the prosecutor and the narrative to be selected should be the most plausible one. The view is conceptually plausible [7] and finds support in * The research has been funded by Research Foundation Flanders.

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A Philosophy of Evidence Law

Cited by 105 publications

References 0 publications

The threshold lies in the method

The threshold lies in the method

¿Cómo se prueba la responsabilidad civil médica en la justicia chilena?

Reconciling Bayesian Epistemology and Narration-based Approaches to Judiciary Fact-finding

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