A Phronetic Ethics of Securitization

Abstract

Intervening in recent debates on normativity in securitization theory, I draw on Aristotle’s notion of phronesis and Morgenthau’s formulation of prudence to articulate an ethical theory that takes seriously the idea that securitization is a deeply intersubjective process. First, I critique Rita Floyd's extant “just securitization theory,” which develops universal moral criteria akin to those of just war theory. While insightful, I argue that both her approach to the study of securitization as an empirical phenomenon and to moral theory are flawed. Then, I develop a novel theory by articulating how securitizing actors ought to exercise phronesis as a mode of ethical reasoning rather than a set of rules to follow. Securitizing actors exercise phronesis when they continuously deliberate about the ends of their actions, consider potential long-term consequences, utilize both abstract knowledge and experience, engage in critical self-reflection, and practice restraint. Throughout the paper, I redeploy the “universal” just securitization concepts of just cause and proportionality as rhetorical devices to help stimulate phronetic judgement.