A pilot model for the liberalization of the Spanish railway market based on combinatorial auctions

Abstract

The liberalization of the railway market in the European Union brings the need to define a competitive mechanism that allows the infrastructure manager to allocate the rights of use of railway segments to the new emerging train operating companies. For this allocation process, we propose the use of combinatorial auctions, a mechanism that has provided successful results in the liberalization of other markets such as the radio spectrum. In this context, the aim of this paper is to provide a high-level description of a pilot model for the liberalization of the Spanish railway market based on combinatorial auctions.

An improved sequential auction with complementarity for pricing the construction land quota

“…First, the transaction system of the quota is widely adopted in numerous cities in China. In the European Union, the use of railways is split into several segments and periods, because their use is complementary [ 38 ]. Our model and conclusions are applicable to governments and decision-makers for their practices.…”

“…From the aforementioned studies, the sequential auction with complementarity has been deeply studied and already used in reality. For example, the use of railways in the European Union is split into several segments and periods of being complementary, which are auctioned sequentially [ 38 ]. Although the sequential auction with complementarity has not been applied to the transaction of construction land quotas, it is a reasonable and feasible method to price the quota.…”