A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism

Abstract

Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's structurally similar argument. If Street succeeds in debunking normative realism, I argue, then she also succeeds in debunking atheism. But atheism is a suppressed premise of the Darwinian Dilemma as well as a commitment of almost all normative anti‐realists. If Street's argument entails theism, then the Darwinian Dilemma is internally incoherent and should be abandoned by almost everyone.

Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature

“…See also sect. II.a of Crow, 2016. 9 See O'Connor, 1994Ginet, 1995, p. 407;Fitelson and Sober, 1998; and van Cleve, 2002, pp.…”

“…I am thereby following the advice of Bergmann and Kain (, p. 13), who suggest that those working on EMDAs ‘consider Plantinga's “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism” and the many different replies to it. Since there is already a significant literature on that topic, it would be worth mining it for potentially helpful responses to more narrowly targeted evolutionary debunking arguments.’ Daniel Crow () also follows this advice. I discovered his paper after writing mine and was pleased to find our papers to be complementary.…”

Theistic Moral Realism, Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, and a Catholic Philosophy of Nature

“…Evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism are a varied lot, so I will offer several approximate characterizations of prominent EDAs, before focusing my 1 See, to name a few of many, Street (2006), Joyce (2006), Kahane (2011), Clark-Doane (2012). 2 These authors include, at least, Crow (2016), Moon (2017a), Bogardus, (2016), Wielenberg (2016). 3 See first Roeber (2009) and more recently, Moon (2017b).…”

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism

“…Although the theme is similar to mine, the details of Rea's argument are different: his main argument is that moral realists must rely on considerations of simplicity and that these in turn imply something like theism. I will make no such claims. More recently, Crow () explores the relationship between Street's () evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and Plantinga's (: 216–237) evolutionary argument against naturalism and in defense of theism.…”

“…More recently, Crow () explores the relationship between Street's () evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and Plantinga's (: 216–237) evolutionary argument against naturalism and in defense of theism.…”