A Plea for Falsehoods

Comesaña, Juan

doi:10.1111/phpr.12523

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…For Normative Falsies, an agent's evidence can include false beliefs or propositions, and these falsehoods can be normative. This view is endorsed, among others, by Comesaña (2018), Gibbons (2013), Fantl and McGrath (2009), and Conee and Feldman (2004). Schroeder (2008) might also endorse this view, depending on how to interpret his concept of "subjective evidence."…”

Section: The Similarities Between False Beliefs and Misleading Evidencementioning

confidence: 91%

False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence

Daoust

2020

Theoria

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False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet, some epistemologists think that, while one's evidence is normative (i.e., one's available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one's false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs, and holding that only the latter may be evidence. I argue that this is puzzling: If misleading evidence and false beliefs share so many important similarities, why treat them differently? I also argue that, given the striking similarities between false beliefs and misleading evidence, many arguments for the factivity of evidence overgeneralize. That is, if these arguments were conclusive, they would also entail that the evidence cannot be misleading. But this is an overgeneralization, since the evidence can be misleading.

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Section: The Similarities Between False Beliefs and Misleading Evidencementioning

confidence: 91%

False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence

Daoust

2020

Theoria

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“…For previous defences of the possibility of false evidence, seeArnold (2013),Comesaña and Kantin (2010),Comesaña (2015Comesaña ( , 2020aComesaña ( , 2020b,Drake (2018),Fantl (2015),Rizzieri (2011), Shaffer (2015, andSchroeder (2008Schroeder ( , 2021a. For defences of the veridicality of evidence, seeLittlejohn (2012Littlejohn ( , 2013 andWilliamson (2000).…”

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confidence: 99%

Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false

Littlejohn

Dutant

2021

Philos Stud

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Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its apparent advantages are illusory. First, it cannot adequately handle some not terribly strange cases of perceptual error. Second, it cannot explain why one should plan to use their evidence to update their beliefs. The second issue allows us to explain why cases of misplaced certainty do not require us to introduce false evidence into our views and that why the alleged advantage of worldly internalism in resisting sceptical pressures is illusory.

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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence

Schellenberg,

Comesaña

2023

Philos Stud

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A Plea for Falsehoods

Cited by 6 publications

References 38 publications

False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence

False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence

Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false

Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence

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