A political-economy analysis of the provision of urban anti-crime technologies in a model with three cities

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Kourtit, Karima; Nijkamp, Peter

doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120211

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The concept of institutional political economy is various (Batabyal, Kourtit, & Nijkamp, 2020;Lorz, 2020;Rizvi, Douglas, Williams, & Hill, 2020). As the concept is popularly used in different contexts, there are various variants of institutional political economy implemented as the objective and alternative of analysis.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Batabyal, Kourtit, and Nijkamp (2020) wrote, a policy itself concerns the commune or public welfare. The economic and political linkages can simultaneously discuss various aspects, processes, and political institutions concerning economic activity (Kasdi, 2020;Lorz, 2020).…”

Section: Institutional Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Besides, the political economy system forms power relations in society. It determines the values and norms that will more or less determine "what" and "how" various economic activities are carried out in society (Batabyal, Kourtit, & Nijkamp, 2020). Political economy is very appropriate to see other socio-cultural factors influencing an economic phenomenon, apart from pure economic rigidity (Estache & Foucart, 2021).…”

Section: Institutional Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Market conditions also caused rubber farmers to be trapped in patronage relationships with "collectors" and tapper labor with farm owners. However, from an economic perspective, when rubber is low at the farmer level, it is caused by a lack of demand and a high supply of rubber in the market (Batabyal, Kourtit, & Nijkamp, 2020). The fundamental weakness of the primary economic system is that the motives behind the participants in a particular process or event are not criticised (Safriyana, Marimin, Anggraeni, & Sailah, 2020).…”

Section: A Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The relationship between actors in the rubber trade system has formed a unique relationship of value, placing one position higher than the others. This relationship is described as a patronclient relationship, which is common among traditional farmers in Southeast Asia (Batabyal, Kourtit, & Nijkamp, 2020). With the existing trade system conditions, political economy analysis is appropriate to measure how the benefits obtained by each actor in the trade system process occur, or in other words, who gets what, how much and how to get it.…”

Section: A Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Can Rubber Farmers and Institutions Do for Supply Chain Networks: The Political Economy Analysis

Saadah¹,

Agustiyara²

2022

j. borneo adm.

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This research analysed the process of the supply chain of natural rubber between Tauke (collectors) and farmers and between farmers who have their rubber plantation and their tapper labour, with the institutional political economy analysis in Batanghari Regency, Jambi province. The research was descriptive research with a qualitative approach. This research used in-depth interviews with particular informants with purposive sampling and participative observation methods in certain activities. Data that had been obtained was analysed and qualitatively described. This research found that the collectors still overpowered the supply-chain process of natural rubber in the Batanghari Regency – trader, both at the village, sub-regency, and Regency levels. Other institutions, such as the auction market and crumb rubber factory, were located only in particular locations, so they were not accessible to the whole farmers in the Regency. As a result, several channels of marketing systems made different prices from what the farmers got. Institutional marketing indeed could be implemented. It has been proven by institutions such as auctions, joint venture groups, and other groups. Besides, some non–economic aspects can affect the way price parameter changes in the supply chain process, and they are; institution characteristics, marketing channel, and patronage relationship between farmers and traders. Batanghari Regency government should re-examine their plantation regulation about the marketing mechanism until the lowest level, villages. The government should have encouraged a mutual understanding among farmers so that similar efforts could occur elsewhere.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutional Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutional Political Economymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

What Can Rubber Farmers and Institutions Do for Supply Chain Networks: The Political Economy Analysis

Saadah¹,

Agustiyara²

2022

j. borneo adm.

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Ensuring a just transition: The electric vehicle revolution from a human rights perspective

Rouhana,

Zhu,

Chacon-Hurtado

et al. 2024

Journal of Cleaner Production

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A political-economy perspective on mayoral elections and urban crime

Batabyal

Beladi

2022

Socio-Economic Planning Sciences

Self Cite

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We provide a political-economy analysis of crime prevention in an arbitrary city in the United States. City residents (voters) elect mayors (politicians) and elected mayors determine the resources to be allocated to crime prevention. Between the two time periods, there is an election.Politicians are either honest or dishonest. The marginal cost of public monies measures how efficiently an elected mayor converts tax receipts into crime prevention. Voters have identical per period utility functions. We ascertain the equilibrium outcome and per period voter well-being.Second, we show that an increase in reduces the equilibrium allocation of resources to crime prevention and voter well-being. Third, a dishonest politician can delay the revelation of his dishonesty. A critical value of , * , exists such that a dishonest incumbent separates and loses the election if and only if * and he pools and is re-elected otherwise. Finally, we note that an increase in can raise voter well-being when politicians are more likely to be dishonest.

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A political-economy analysis of the provision of urban anti-crime technologies in a model with three cities

Cited by 5 publications

References 27 publications

What Can Rubber Farmers and Institutions Do for Supply Chain Networks: The Political Economy Analysis

What Can Rubber Farmers and Institutions Do for Supply Chain Networks: The Political Economy Analysis

Ensuring a just transition: The electric vehicle revolution from a human rights perspective

A political-economy perspective on mayoral elections and urban crime

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