A possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience of pain

Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of feelings, and in particular of negative affect and of pain, assume that creatures that feel and care about the outcomes of their behavior outperform those that do not in terms of their evolutionary fitness. Such accounts, however, can only work if feelings can be shown to contribute to fitness-influencing outcomes. Simply assuming that a learner that feels and cares about outcomes is more strongly motivated than one that does is not enough, if only because motivation can be tied directly to outcomes by incorporating an appropriate reward function, without leaving any apparent role to feelings (as it is done in state-of-the-art engineered systems based on reinforcement learning). Here, we propose a possible mechanism whereby pain contributes to fitness: an actor-critic functional architecture for reinforcement learning, in which pain reflects the costs imposed on actors in their bidding for control, so as to promote honest signaling and ultimately help the system optimize learning and future behavior.

The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans

“…Or, as Lacalli puts it, animals lacking an evolved central nervous system might nevertheless "experience a buzz of random real-time noise" (2020, p. 7). In a less speculative vein, other researchers talk about endogenous feelings like thirst, hunger, shortness of breath, or pain, as being nonintentional, i.e., purely phenomenal, (Brandom, 1994;Metzinger, 2020;Rorty, 1979) and prior to representational phenomenal consciousness (Godfrey-Smith, 2016; Kolodny et al, 2021;Solms & Friston, 2018). Thus, intentionality understood as aboutness or referral directed at something represented by the (neural) activity of the system might not be needed for phenomenal consciousness.…”

“…Given that phenomenal consciousness is an ongoing discussion, certain de-bates at its core remain open: some theories predict functional differences between conscious and non-conscious systems (e.g., Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2021;Mashour et al, 2020) and others do not (Oizumi et al, 2014). Some researchers assert that phenomenal consciousness does not need to have/be an adaptive function (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019;Hobson & Friston, 2016;Maley & Piccinini, 2018;Tononi & Koch, 2015) while other researchers argue that it does (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016Kolodny et al, 2021;Solms & Friston, 2018). Another disagreement is that for some researchers, phenomenal consciousness might not necessarily imply content nor its 'synonyms', like representations, referral, or intentionality, even though it often has content, at least for our species (Block, 1995;Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007;Hutto & Myin, 2013).…”

The conductor model of consciousness, our neuromorphic twins, and the human-AI deal

“…It could be objected that this simple approach fails by ignoring the functionality of the affective component of pain. It seems reasonable to argue that the affective component evolved for a purpose and is not a mere epiphenomenon (e.g., Kolodny et al, 2021). Indeed, it is usually assumed that the affective component is crucial for the motivational aspect of pain-it is what makes us to take protective action (e.g., Papini et al 2015;Talbot et al, 2019).…”

The Consciousness of Pain: A Thalamocortical Perspective

“…Cingulotomy describes the surgical removal of the anterior cingulate cortex in patients with chronic, excruciating pain, resulting in them retaining the sensory but losing the affective component of pain, an effect quite similar to morphine administration. In other words, they feel the pain but do not mind it (asymbolia) [54]. Clearly, by altering the brain's connectivity we can "reduce" the experience of pain, and possibly other conscious experiences as well, to a basic phenomenal awareness.…”