A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, O. V.

doi:10.1111/ecoj.12404

Cited by 45 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“… In this issue, Ausubel and Baranov () as well as Cramton and Ockenfels () deal with auctions of multiple items with multiple units that also allow for complementarities (super‐additive values). Greve and Pollitt () consider auctions of multiple independent items, while Holmberg () studies auctions of multiple identical units of one item. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study

Betz

Greiner

Schweitzer

et al. 2017

The Economic Journal

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We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.

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confidence: 99%

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study

Betz

Greiner

Schweitzer

et al. 2017

The Economic Journal

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“…In this note, we presented some preliminary results pointing at a possible explanation why certain reference point rules are more manipulable than others. Even though the VCG-nearest payment rule is widely used in practice [Ausubel and Baranov, 2017], our analysis shows that it has a relatively high susceptibility to being manipulated. With the VCG point having a sensitivity of 1, VCG-nearest behaves as an even mixture between the first price and VCG payment rules (in the appropriate sub-case), as has been shown previously .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules

Bosshard¹,

Seuken²

2021

Preprint

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In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders' Shapley values. We define a sensitivity metric, and provide analytical results for this metric in LLG, for six different payment vectors used as reference points for minimum-revenue core-selecting payment rules. We furthermore show how this sensitivity affects the derivative of the resulting payment rules.

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“…ICAs have found widespread application in practice. For example, just between 2008 and 2014, the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) (Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom 2006) has been used to conduct more than 15 spectrum auctions and has generated more than $20 Billion in total revenue (Ausubel and Baranov 2017). Another important application of ICAs are auctions for building offshore wind farms (Ausubel and Cramton 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Weissteiner

Seuken

2020

AAAI

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In this paper, we study the design of deep learning-powered iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). We build on prior work where preference elicitation was done via kernelized support vector regressions (SVRs). However, the SVR-based approach has limitations because it requires solving a machine learning (ML)-based winner determination problem (WDP). With expressive kernels (like gaussians), the ML-based WDP cannot be solved for large domains. While linear or quadratic kernels have better computational scalability, these kernels have limited expressiveness. In this work, we address these shortcomings by using deep neural networks (DNNs) instead of SVRs. We first show how the DNN-based WDP can be reformulated into a mixed integer program (MIP). Second, we experimentally compare the prediction performance of DNNs against SVRs. Third, we present experimental evaluations in two medium-sized domains which show that even ICAs based on relatively small-sized DNNs lead to higher economic efficiency than ICAs based on kernelized SVRs. Finally, we show that our DNN-powered ICA also scales well to very large CA domains.

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A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Cited by 45 publications

References 18 publications

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study

Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study

Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules

Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

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