A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP

Grossman, Gene M.; Dunoff, Jeffrey L.; Kenners, Jeffrey

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511674518.011

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Ó 2020 Agricultural Economics Society country markets is relative tariff preferences. This result that the GSP coefficient is not statistically significant is somewhat surprising because it is commonly accepted that GSP 'side conditions' form major trade barriers for recipient countries (see, e.g., Panagariya, 2003;Grossman and Sykes, 2005). While many countries, including the EU, the USA, and Canada, have revised their GSP programmes partly to address concerns regarding their programme design, many of these efforts were still ongoing in the sampling period.…”

Section: Assessing Relative Market Access Offered By the Gsp Programmementioning

confidence: 97%

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Truly Preferential Treatment? Reconsidering the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences with Competing Suppliers

Sharma¹,

Grant²,

Boys³

2020

J Agricultural Economics

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Empirical research on preferential treatment for developing economies has generally not considered how relative preferential margins might influence market access to a given destination market. In this paper, we develop and apply two indices to measure the tariff component of bilateral and multilateral trade restrictions less developed countries face in a given export destination. These indices are then used in a gravity model framework to re-evaluate the trade effects of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The trade facilitation impacts of the GSP are found to vary both across products and across export destinations. Overall results indicate that the GSP has increased relative market access of low-income countries to developed country markets and boosted exports from these countries by 26-28%.

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Section: Assessing Relative Market Access Offered By the Gsp Programmementioning

confidence: 97%

“…In a related work, Bureau et al (2007), Carpenter and Lendle (2010), and Hakobyan (2015) assess the GSP programme utilisation rate. Further, MacPhee andRosenbaum (1989), DeVault (1996), Grossman and Sykes (2005), and Agostino et al (2010) evaluate the compliance costs of the programme.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truly Preferential Treatment? Reconsidering the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences with Competing Suppliers

Sharma¹,

Grant²,

Boys³

2020

J Agricultural Economics

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“…In the absence of an agreement on such criteria, in the context of tariff preferences it is left to developed country GSP donors to determine who to include as beneficiaries and on what grounds. Perhaps this is a better result than having WTO Tribunals establish the necessary criteria, but it presents ' the danger of a return to the pre-UNCTAD days of widespread discrimination ' 69 and hence a further incursion into the greater principle of non-discrimination in the WTO. More worryingly, the Appellate Body recently endorsed this situation.…”

Section: Distinguishing Between Developing Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A legal principle of special and differential treatment for WTO disputes

Mitchell

2006

World Trade Review

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Based on the notion that the needs of developing countries are substantially different from those of developed countries, the principle of special and differential treatment (S&D) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows a certain degree of discrimination in favour of developing countries. This article considers the potential of this principle in resolving disputes within the WTO. S&D developed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and is today reflected in a series of provisions in various WTO agreements. The meaning of S&D as a broader principle could assist in interpreting such provisions. In addition, the principle of S&D could conceivably be used as part of the inherent jurisdiction of Panels and the Appellate Body in connection with procedural aspects of dispute settlement. However, the article concludes that, due to the incoherence of S&D, as well as the difficulties involved in distinguishing between developing countries and in advancing their interests as an amorphous group, S&D is presently of limited value as an independent principle in WTO dispute settlement.

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“…In fact, the existing nonreciprocal preferential arrangements may be especially inefficient given that there is not only discrimination between developed and developing economies, but also across the latter. This possibility is codified in the GATT in its distinction between developing countries and LDCs, but in reality discrimination is significant even within each group: as mentioned in section 2.1, donor countries face very soft constraints when deciding which countries, which products, how much, and when to offer preferential access, and they often exercise their discretion (Blanchard and Hakobyan, 2015;Grossman and Sykes, 2005). This discrimination yields a negative externality for the developing countries that do not qualify for the preferential treatment.…”

Section: Lack Of Nondiscriminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SeeGrossman and Sykes (2005) for an excellent discussion of the European and American GSP programs, and of the legal and economic aspects regarding discrimination across devoping countires under the Enabling Clause.…”

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confidence: 99%

Special and differential treatment for developing countries

Ornelas¹

2002

Globalization, Marginalization and Development

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Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries (SDT) constitutes a central feature of the GATT/WTO system. Its formal goal is to foster export-led growth in developing countries. Its theoretical foundations and empirical support are, however, weak at best. In particular, SDT conflicts with the GATT's two key principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination, compromising the efficiency of the multilateral trading system. Still, if SDT provisions help those who most need help, sacrificing economic efficiency may be justifiable. However, there are numerous criticisms, on theoretical and empirical grounds, to the premises and the achievements of SDT-based disciplines, casting serious doubt on its effectiveness in helping developing countries trade and grow. For researchers, the good news is that there is plenty of room for progress, with several important areas where our understanding remains unsatisfactory but progress is feasible-that is, where the expected return to research effort seems unusually high.

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A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP

Cited by 12 publications

References 19 publications

Truly Preferential Treatment? Reconsidering the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences with Competing Suppliers

Truly Preferential Treatment? Reconsidering the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences with Competing Suppliers

A legal principle of special and differential treatment for WTO disputes

Special and differential treatment for developing countries

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