A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

Abstract

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene–culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

Cooperation and partner choice among Agta hunter-gatherer children: An evolutionary developmental perspective

“…Much developmental work on cooperation focuses on the latter how questions– how , from whom , and when do children learn cooperative behaviour?–especially in terms of cultural transmission (e.g., [ 12 , 13 , 68 ]), without necessarily asking why these patterns exist and whether said behaviour is adaptive [ 1 , 69 , 70 ]. While children likely acquire much of their cooperative behaviour through social learning, this social learning likely reflects fitness-enhancing considerations [ 71 , 72 ]. Acquiring these adaptive behaviours may also be explicable in terms of non-social mechanisms, such as individual learning or reaction norms.…”

Investigating the effects of social information on spite in an online game

“…Cross-culturally, there is evidence that altruism can be influenced by context-specific social norms (Henrich et al, 2010 ). However, when also shown the payoffs of others, individuals appear to engage in payoff-biased copying and reduce their altruism (Burton-Chellew et al, 2017b ; Burton-chellew & Amico, 2021 ; Molleman et al, 2014 ; Watson et al, 2021 ). In ultimatum games, a theoretical model showed that a form of payoff-biased social learning resulted in average offerings of between 40 and 50% (Zhang, 2013 ).…”

“…Regarding the information source, we consider conformity (or copy-the-majority; Boyd & Richerson, 1985 ; Morgan & Laland, 2012 ) and copy-the-successful (McElreath & Henrich, 2003 ; Sarin & Dukas, 2009 ) social learning strategies. Both have been documented in a variety of contexts (reviewed in Kendal et al, 2018 ; Kendal & Watson, 2023 ), including studies investigating altruism (Burton-Chellew et al, 2017a ; Burton-Chellew & Amico, 2021 ; Watson et al, 2021 ). Note, however, that some studies have found no effect of information source on transmission.…”

The restart effect in social dilemmas shows humans are self-interested not altruistic

“…The altruistic explanation often posits that contributions are motivated by a uniquely human desire to make sacrifices on behalf of the group and to conform with local levels of cooperation ( 1 , 2 , 4 , 8 , 21 , 24 , although see refs. 25 – 27 ). Initial contributions then unravel as disappointed cooperators learn that others are not as cooperative as they mistakenly thought (Conditional Cooperators hypothesis) ( 1 , 4 , 8 , 12 , 21 ).…”

“…Although there is growing evidence that confusion and learning is important in public goods games ( 12 – 15 , 19 , 20 , 22 , 23 , 26 , 27 , 39 , 44 – 47 ), such conclusions are challenged by one intriguing phenomenon, the “Restart Effect” ( 21 ). When players in repeated public goods games are surprisingly told, after the final round, that they will play again, cooperation tends to immediately increase ( 36 , 48 – 52 ).…”