A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties

Ramón, Emilio Calvo; Gutiérrez, Esther

doi:10.1007/bf02568511

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2020

2021

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Cited by 2 publications

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“…He verified that there is a unique solution on the set of all TU-games that satisfies nonemptiness, Pareto optimality, covariance under strategic equivalence, the equal treatment property, a reduced game property, and the converse reduced game property. In view of the stability of a preimputation, which means that no player has incentives to move from the preimputation, Calvo and Gutiérrez [1] first defined the strong stability property. The least core of a TU-game is characterized using this property.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Prekernel of Cooperative Games with Alpha-Excess

2021

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In this paper, we introduce a new approach to measure the dissatisfaction for coalitions of players in cooperative transferable utility games. This is done by considering affine (and convex) combinations of the classical excess and the proportional excess. Based on this so-called α-excess, we define new solution concepts for cooperative games, such as the α-prenucleolus and the α-prekernel. The classical prenucleolus and prekernel are a special case. We characterize the α-prekernel by strong stability and the α-balanced surplus property. Also, we show that the payoff vector generated by the α-prenucleolus belongs to the α-prekernel.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%