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AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
OCTOBER 2004
REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREDFinal Aug 02 -Mar 04
TITLE AND SUBTITLE
AGENTS OVERCOMING RESOURCE INDEPENDENT SCALING THREATS
AUTHOR(S)H. Van Dyke Parunak, Sven Brueckner, John A. Sauter, and Robert Savit
FUNDING NUMBERSC -F30602-00-C-0134 PE -62301E PR -ANTS TA -00 WU -01
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Altarum PO Box 134001 Ann Arbor Michigan 48113-4001
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERN/A
SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Defense
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)This project uses abstract simulation models of resource allocation and mathematical techniques inspired by statistical physics to study the nonlinear emergent dynamics of distributed decentralized resource allocation. Our techniques seek to characterize the dynamics that may be anticipated in real systems, to predict pathological dynamics such as peaks in required computational effort and catastrophic breakdown in performance, and to develop control methods based on this understanding. Our general approach begins with a set of abstract Resource Allocation Games (RAG). These games are derived from the Minority Game, a simple model of competition for scarce re-sources that captures essential features of interactions among agents that are heterogeneous, autonomous, boundedly rational, adaptable, parallel, co-situated, and experienced. Our research explores and generally confirms two hypotheses concerning the dynamics of resource allocation.• The Generality Hypothesis asserts that a generic RAG exhibits dynamics that are intrinsic to resource allocation, independent of mechanism.• The Specificity Hypothesis asserts that a RAG can be developed to resemble a specific re-source allocation mechanism and study its (idiosyncratic) dynamics. Altarum's scientific work during this period has focused on two topics. First, we have explored the feasibility of a quick review tool (QuiRT) that would use rapid characterizations of a task allocation matrix to estimate the solvability of the matrix. Second, we have extended the resource allocation game (our generalization of the minority game) to arbitrary networks of interacting resource allocators, thus enabling exploration of the dynamics of logistical systems such as supply networks Log...