A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe

Tasnádi, Attila

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00264-0

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Tasnádi (2000) provides another game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model, based on a price-setting game with one large firm and a nonatomic fringe in which all firms have strictly convex cost functions. In a follow-up paper Tasnádi (2004) shows that for the case of strictly convex cost functions, the large firm will not accept the role of the leader in a simple two-period timing game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Tasnádi

2010

J. Econ.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Abstract:We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Tasnádi

2010

J. Econ.

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“…We gave another microfoundation of Forchheimer's model in a previous paper (Tasnádi, 2000) in a market with one 'large' firm and infinitely many 'small' firms, where we assumed strictly convex cost functions and the large firm to be the exogenously given first mover. Now we want to investigate whether the large firm accepts the role of the first mover.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%