A Pricing Mechanism which Implements in Nash Equilibria a Rate Allocation Problem in Networks

VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

“…Semret [10] proposed an efficient allocation mechanism in which each buyer submits a two dimensional bid, one dimension for unit price, and the other for maximum quantity. Recently, other work using two dimensional bids appeared: [11,12]. The mechanism of [12] can be viewed as an instance of the VCG-Kelly mechanism, but for two-parameter surrogate functions.…”

VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

“…The rules (11) and (12) are the same as (7) and (8), but with bids W r (x r ) replaced by the surrogate functions V r (w r , x r ), based on one-dimensional bids. The rules x x x VCGK and m m m VCGK , together with the true valuation functions, U U U , determine a game among the buyers.…”

“…Semret [10] proposed an efficient allocation mechanism in which each buyer submits a two dimensional bid, one dimension for unit price, and the other for maximum quantity. Recently, other work using two dimensional bids appeared: [11,12]. The mechanism of [12] can be viewed as an instance of the VCG-Kelly mechanism, but for two-parameter surrogate functions.…”

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

“…Nash's mass-action interpretation of NE has also been adopted in engineering publications where mechanism design ideas are used to solve decentralized resource allocation problems (see (Stoenescu & Ledyard 2006, Sharma & Teneketzis 2011, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012b, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012c, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012a, Sharma & Teneketzis 2012, Kash & Parkes 2010). Our interpretation of NE is similar to that of (Reichelstein & Reiter 1988), (Groves & Ledyard 1987).…”