A principal-agent model in a supplier-led supply chain under asymmetric information

Zhang, Jianxiong; Feng, Lijie; Hu, Mingmao

doi:10.1093/imaman/dpt003

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Secondly, in the configuration of seller/vendor-buyer, under asymmetric information of buyer's production cost, Raj et al [6] investigated the optimal level of greening and corporate social responsibility, Li et al [17] designed the coordination mechanism, and Zhang and Luo [27] designed the optimal quantity discount contract of coordinating a perishable products supply chain. irdly, in the configuration of supplier-manufacturer, Zhang et al [28] explored a supply chain with a dominant supplier without knowing the production cost of the manufacturer. Yang et al [29] addressed the reservation pricing strategy of a fashion supply chain, in which the manufacturer owned private information about production cost.…”

Section: Asymmetric Information In Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational Strategy for Low‐Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Wei

Qin

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Carbon emission reduction has become a common hot topic around the world. Although the previous literature has proven that the asymmetric information and fairness concerns would influence the operational strategy for low-carbon supply chain, it hardly touched the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, which contradicted practical observations and experimental evidence. Incorporating the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, this paper investigates a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with discrete types including selfish S-type and fairness-concerned F-type. The manufacturer can observe and thereby know the behavioral type of the retailer in the scenario of symmetric information, while it cannot in the scenario of asymmetric information. In the approach of game theory, the optimal carbon emission reducing strategy and pricing strategy in the symmetric scenario and asymmetric scenario are achieved successively. By comparing the above two scenarios, the impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns at the individual level and systematic level are analyzed, respectively. A case study is offered before concluding some implications for the supply chain management. The findings include the following: Firstly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns enhances the carbon emission reduction significantly. Although the fairness concerns alone decrease the carbon emission reduction, the asymmetric information increases with the dominating power. Secondly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns raises the wholesale price and retail price dramatically. Although the impact of either fairness concerns or asymmetric information randomly changes with the behavioral type and information structure, their interactive impacts are stable and change smoothly. Thirdly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns promotes a fairer profit distribution, while either fairness concerns or asymmetric information alone hardly changes the overall profit of the low-carbon supply chain.

show abstract

Section: Asymmetric Information In Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational Strategy for Low‐Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Wei

Qin

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Finally, note that our model is static, in the sense that renegotiating after the first stage is not part of the stage‐gate contract. We refer the interested reader to, for example, Zhang, Wansheng, Feng, and Hu () for a dynamic principal‐agent model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stage‐Gate Contracts to Screen Agents with Inside Information

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Stage‐gate contracts are common in R&D projects, and outsourcing of R&D (from a principal to an agent) is becoming more prevalent. We explore how the principal can best formulate an outsourcing contract when the agent's effort is unobservable (moral hazard) and the agent has inside information (adverse selection) in a stage‐gate setting with two distinct stages. We find that the stage‐gate contract can help offset the information asymmetry and that the agent pays an upfront buy‐in.

show abstract

Approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract under asymmetric cost information

Nosoohi

Nookabadi

2016

IMA J Management Math

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A principal-agent model in a supplier-led supply chain under asymmetric information

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Operational Strategy for Low‐Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Operational Strategy for Low‐Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information of Fairness Concerns

Stage‐Gate Contracts to Screen Agents with Inside Information

Approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract under asymmetric cost information

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About