A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts.

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Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

Majeed

2017

Synthese

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Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in 'serious metaphysics': roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with 'the Canberra Plan', a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67 (13): 427-446, 1970, Australas J Philos 50:249-258, 1972 and Jackson (Monist 77:93-110, 1994(Monist 77:93-110, , 1998. There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between conceptual analysis, as it is typically employed in the Canberra plan, and a version of it defended by Jackson himself. In this paper, I elucidate this distinction, and employ examples from the history of science to argue the use of the former, but not the latter, incurs certain problems of conceptual change. Moreover, I also argue neither can be used to undertake serious metaphysics-the former because of the aforementioned problems, and the latter due to the machinery it employs to solve them.

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A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility

Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility

Physicalism or Anti-physicalism: A Disjunctive Account

Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

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