A Proof-of-Trust Consensus Protocol for Enhancing Accountability in Crowdsourcing Services

Zou, Jun; Ye, Bin; Qu, Lie; Orgun, Mehmet A.; Li, Lei

doi:10.1109/tsc.2018.2823705

Cited by 177 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Specifically, the mutual interaction between the blockchain provider and cyberinsurer forms a noncooperative two-player leader-level subgame for achieving the equilibrium of the service price, the investment ratio, and the cyber-insurance policy. Then, the interaction among a number of users forms the followerlevel noncooperative subgame for determining the service demand from the blockchain provider 5 . The Stackelberg game can be formally defined as follows.…”

Section: Stackelberg Game Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…defines the domain of x as an M-polyhedron; 5. The reason that the users are in the same level, i.e., lower-level, is that they have the same set of information and make decisions simultaneously.…”

Section: Stackelberg Game Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I N the past few years, blockchain technologies have attracted tremendous attention from both industry and academia for distributively providing the irreversible, tamper-evident database of tokenized asset transactions [1]. Furthermore, with the smart contracts [2] enabled on top of the decentralized consensus [1], blockchains are envisaged to be the "game changer" in various areas ranging from Peer-to-Peer (P2P) resource allocation/trading, e.g., distributed cloud storage [3], to financial services, e.g., digital identity management [4] and online markets for crowdsourcing services [5]. Although with the advantages such as open access, disintermediation, and pure self-organization, open-access/permissionless blockchains rely on the condition of honest majority to guarantee the data integrity and service security, especially when the Nakamoto consensus protocol based on proof-of-work (PoW) is adopted [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Feng

Wang

Xiong

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.

show abstract

Section: Stackelberg Game Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Stackelberg Game Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Feng

Wang

Xiong

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, most of the suggested alternatives 5 rely either on the ownership of special physical hardware (e.g. [2], [3], [4]), or trade-off the decentralization of the system towards a permissioned Blockchain model with consensus aciheved by variants of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocols, such as in [5] [6]). One of the plausible alternatives to PoW is the concept of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, to further minimize the effect of sybil attacks, our protocol ensures that the trust network will never evolve in such a way which would allow newcomer nodes to reach the top-trusted ranks of the system within a predefined number of epochs, allowing timely detection of malicious behavior by the majority of the system players. 6 Our PoT mechanism while still using PoW, is assured to use PoW only by a small ranked set of participating peers, thus drastically reducing power costs. In the rest of the paper, we formalize our proposed construction and demonstrate how each of its components is designed to address the challenges of establishing a PoT Blockchain system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust Mends Blockchains: Living up to Expectations

Bahri

Girdzijauskas

2019

2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

At the heart of Blockchains is the trustless leader election mechanism for achieving consensus among pseudoanonymous peers, without the need of oversight from any third party or authority whatsoever. So far, two main mechanisms are being discussed: proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS). PoW relies on demonstration of computational power, and comes with the markup of huge energy wastage in return of the stake in cyrpto-currency. PoS tries to address this by relying on owned stake (i.e., amount of crypto-currency) in the system. In both cases, Blockchains are limited to systems with financial basis. This forces non-crypto-currency Blockchain applications to resort to "permissioned" setting only, effectively centralizing the system. However, non-crypto-currency permisionless blockhains could enable secure and self-governed peer-to-peer structures for numerous emerging application domains, such as education and health, where some trust exists among peers. This creates a new possibility for valuing trust among peers and capitalizing it as the basis (stake) for reaching consensus. In this paper we show that there is a viable way for permisionless non-financial Blockhains to operate in completely decentralized environments and achieve leader election through proof-of-trust (PoT). In our PoT construction, peer trust is extracted from a trust network that emerges in a decentralized manner and is used as a waiver for the effort to be spent for PoW, thus dramatically reducing total energy expenditure of the system. Furthermore, our PoT construction is resilient to the risk of small cartels monopolizing the network (as it happens with the mining-pool phenomena in PoW) and is not vulnerable to sybils. We evluate security guarantees, and perform experimental evaluation of our construction, demonstrating up to 10-fold energy savings compared to PoW without trading off any of the decentralization characteristics, with further guarantees against risks of monopolization. Index Terms-Blockchain, Proof of Work, Bitcoin, Distributed Ledger, PoW is expensive, Proof of Trust, PoW alternative 1 We refer here to public Blockchains where identities are not managed. Although such systems are technically anonymous, they practically can only guarantee pseudo-anonymity depending on usage patterns and peers practices. 2 We differentiate between Blockchain, with big B, as the technology that comprises all the components of the system in terms of rules, mechanisms, protocols, etc., and between blockchain which refers to the ledger of chained blocks of transactions. 3 e.g., Ethereum Blockchain

show abstract

SLChain: A secure and low‐storage pressure sharding blockchain

Tian,

Xu,

Tian

2023

Concurrency and Computation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As a distributed ledger technology, blockchain's low throughput is challenging to support large‐scale applications. Sharding is one way to solve this problem, but the security of existing sharded blockchains is not enough. In addition, with the increase of time, the node storage pressure in the shard will also increase. Therefore, SLChain was proposed as a secure and low storage pressure sharding blockchain. SLChain works together between shards for block validation to avoid inconsistencies caused by a single shard being controlled by adversaries. As well as by relying on a reputation‐established confirmation committee that allows blocks to be confirmed quickly and without forking. In addition, a secure ledger pruning mechanism is designed to make the space required for nodes grow very slowly over time, reducing the storage pressure on nodes. The results show that SLChain can improve security and throughput, and the node storage pressure is small.

show abstract

A Proof-of-Trust Consensus Protocol for Enhancing Accountability in Crowdsourcing Services

Cited by 177 publications

References 21 publications

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Trust Mends Blockchains: Living up to Expectations

SLChain: A secure and low‐storage pressure sharding blockchain

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About