A Proposal for a Coherent Ontology of Fundamental Entities

Romero-Maltrana, Diego; Benitez, Federico; Soto, Cristian

doi:10.1007/s10699-018-9548-0

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Explicitly, if the theory is a framework theory, then one should be eliminativist ontic structural realist with respect to it; and if the theory is an interaction theory, then one should be moderate ontic structural realist with respect to it. This approach relates to recent ideas by Romero- Maltrana et al (2018), although reaching different conclusions from similar starting points.…”

Section: Ontic Structural Realismmentioning

confidence: 77%

Structural realism and theory classification

Benitez

2023

Theoria

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Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.

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Section: Ontic Structural Realismmentioning

confidence: 77%

Structural realism and theory classification

Benitez

2023

Theoria

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“…This classification was proposed by Flores (1999), as an improvement over the older distinction made by Einstein (1919) between principle and constructive theories. The improvements over Einstein classification come from a focus on the functional aspect of the distinction, but as claimed by Romero- Maltrana et al (2018) and the ontological aspect stays rele-vant. In Flores' classification, framework theories explain the world in a top-down fashion by means of general principles, upheld on any physical system embedded within the framework.…”

Section: An Ontology Of Barren Worldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barren Worlds

Benitez

2022

Disputatio

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This work explores issues with the eliminativist formulation of ontic structural realism. An ontology that totally eliminates objects is found lacking by arguing, first, that the theoretical frameworks used to support the best arguments against an object-oriented ontology (quantum mechanics, relativity theory, quantum field theory) can be seen in every case as physical models of empty worlds, and therefore do not represent all the information that comes from science, and in particular from fundamental physics, which also includes information about local interactions between objects. Secondly, by giving a critical assessment of the role of symmetries in these fundamental physical theories; and, lastly, by warning about unfounded metaphysical assumptions. An argument is made for a moderate form of structural realism instead, one in which objects play the fundamental role of representing symmetries and bearing their conserved charges, and of participating in the network of interactions observed in the world.

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“…The functional role serves thus as a key for classifying scientific laws, but the information stemming from the epistemic and ontological roles that different theories play in our scientific picture of the world should not be minimised. In this we follow Romero-Maltrana et al (2018), who argue that the ontological aspect of the description is useful at the time of assigning ontological commitments to objects and properties in our theories, as interaction laws assume the existence of interacting objects, whereas framework theories are in principle fully structural and compatible with empty worlds. The epistemic facet is also a source of relevant information.…”

Section: Framework and Interaction Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dispositions and the Least Action Principle

Benitez

Maltrana

2022

Disputatio

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This work deals with obstacles hindering a metaphysics of laws of nature in terms of dispositions, i.e., of fundamental properties that are causal powers. A recent analysis of the principle of least action has put into question the viability of dispositionalism in the case of classical mechanics, generally seen as the physical theory most easily amenable to a dispositional ontology. Here, a proper consideration of the framework role played by the least action principle within the classical image of the world allows us to build a consistent metaphysics of dispositions as charges of interactions. In doing so we develop a general approach that opens the way towards an ontology of dispositions for fundamental physics also beyond classical mechanics.

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A Proposal for a Coherent Ontology of Fundamental Entities

Cited by 9 publications

References 16 publications

Structural realism and theory classification

Structural realism and theory classification

Barren Worlds

Dispositions and the Least Action Principle

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