A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness

Rey, Georges

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-9317-1_1

Cited by 50 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…1 This early attempt at a one-level theory was rejected by early higher-order theorists, but I will argue that this was a mistake, because the reasons for the shift in fact provided no real motivation for preferring genuinely higher-order theories. Moreover, higher-order views have recently come under attack (Rey 1983, Block 1997, Dretske 1997 (originally published in 1993, and face competition from one-level representational theories of consciousness (Dretske 1995). Thus it seems we have good reason to reconsider one-level views of consciousness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

After Brentano: A One‐Level Theory of Consciousness

Thomassoin

2000

European J of Philosophy

132

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confidence: 99%

After Brentano: A One‐Level Theory of Consciousness

Thomassoin

2000

European J of Philosophy

132

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“…these interpretations are remarkably similar to the radical behaviourist deniers of consciousness as epiphenomenal who are opposed to dualism and want to focus on the causation of consciousness by brains and the nervous system as caused biologically, electrically and electrochemically (Churchland 1981;dennett 2001;rey 1983;wegner 2002) and deny the natural attitude as a suitable starting point for clarifying consciousness and intersubjective meaning (hood 2011). if their criticisms were limited to only stating that the natural attitude doesn't know the scientific truth of how vision works, or how the ego moves its hand according to electrical studies of brain during the exercise of free will, then that would be no different to any science stating its outcomes.…”

Section: Problem: How To Bridge Dualism When Consciousness Is Deniedmentioning

confidence: 86%

Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy

Owen

2015

Contributions to Phenomenology

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Contributions to Phenomenologyin CooPeration with the Center for advanCed researCh in Phenomenology volume 79 series editors: nicolas de warren, leuven, belgium dermot moran, university College dublin, dublin, ireland editorial board: lilian alweiss, trinity College dublin, ireland elizabeth behnke, ferndale, wa, usa michael barber, st. louis university, mo, usa rudolf bernet, husserl-archief, Katholieke universiteit leuven, belgium david Carr, emory university, ga, usa Chan-fai Cheung, Chinese university hong Kong, China James dodd, new school university, ny, usa lester embree, florida atlantic university, fl, usa alfredo ferrarin, università di Pisa, italy burt hopkins, seattle university, wa, usa José huertas-Jourda,wilfrid laurier university, Canada Kwok-ying lau, Chinese university hong Kong, China nam-in lee, seoul national university, Korea rosemary r.P. lerner, Pontificia universidad Católica del Perú, Peru dieter lohmar, universität zu Köln, germany william r. mcKenna, miami university, oh, usa algis mickunas, ohio university, oh, usa J.n. mohanty, temple university, Pa, usaJunichi murata, university of tokyo, Japan thomas nenon, the university of memphis, tn, usa thomas m. seebohm, Johannes gutenberg-universität, germany gail soffer, rome, italy anthony steinbock, southern illinois university at Carbondale, il, usa shigeru taguchi, yamagata university, Japan dan Zahavi, university of Copenhagen, denmark richard m. Zaner, vanderbilt university, tn, usa the purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. since its establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published more than 80 titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy. in addition to welcoming monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship, the series encourages original work in phenomenology. the breadth and depth of the series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of phenomenological research. the series is published in cooperation with the Center for advanced research in Phenomenology.all books to be published in this series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance. more information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5811 ian rory owen Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy on Pure Psychology and its Applications in Psychotherapy and mental health Care 2123 issn 0923-9545 Contributions to Phenomenology isbn 978-3-319-13604-2 isbn 978-3-319-13605-9 (ebook)

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“…Carruthers (2000) worries that it seems that a Higher Order mechanism would demand a large amount of cognitive resources (as a person's awareness can be quite complex at times), in which case it's difficult to see how animals, or perhaps even small children, can have the resources needed for awareness. Further, Rey (1983) claims that if all that is needed for awareness is the monitoring of internal states, then many technological devices qualify for awareness, as they, too, monitor their own states, and it seems absurd to confer awareness on a relatively simplistic technological device. White (1987) and Lycan (1996) have responded to this worry.…”

Section: The Higher Order Representational Theories Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 98%

What role do the emotions play in cognition?

Megill

2003

C&E

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This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness -as generally formulated -are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio's (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras' and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing.

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A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness

Cited by 50 publications

References 32 publications

After Brentano: A One‐Level Theory of Consciousness

After Brentano: A One‐Level Theory of Consciousness

Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy

What role do the emotions play in cognition?

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