A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism

McKay, Thomas J.; Johnson, David Kyle

doi:10.5840/philtopics199624219

Cited by 157 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…178-179. See Widerker 1987 for an independent counterexample to (β), and O 'Connor 1993, p. 209 andMcKay andJohnson 1996, pp. 117-118 for criticisms of Widerker's example.)…”

Section: But (Agg) Is Invalid As Mckay Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Turner

2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…178-179. See Widerker 1987 for an independent counterexample to (β), and O 'Connor 1993, p. 209 andMcKay andJohnson 1996, pp. 117-118 for criticisms of Widerker's example.)…”

Section: But (Agg) Is Invalid As Mckay Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Turner

2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…A simple trivial example, however, is enough to show that this principle, derivable from b, simply does not hold (McKay & Johnson, 1996). It was entirely in my power yesterday to flip a coin, or to choose not to.…”

Section: Problems For Incompatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an earlier section we outlined the counter-example by McKay and Johnson (1996) to a rule of inference crucial to van Inwagen's formal argument for incompatibilism. Here it is worth attending to that example again.…”

Section: New Options For Compatibilism: Freedom In Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free will in context: a contemporary philosophical perspective

Grim

2007

Behavioral Sci & The Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Philosophical work on free will is inevitably framed by the problem of free will and determinism. This paper offers an overview of the current state of the philosophical art. Early sections focus on quantum indeterminism, an outline of the most influential logical argument for incompatibilism between free will and determinism, and telling problems that face incompatibilism. A major portion of the paper focuses on the compatiblist alternative, favored by many working philosophers. The conditional account of free will offered by classical compatibilism can be shown to be inadequate. A number of compatibilist options remain open, however, and seem promising for future research. These include 'hierarchical' or 'mesh' accounts of free will, normative perspectives and an approach to free will in terms of an emphasis on context. Final sections draw out the implications of contemporary compatibilism for the brain and behavioral sciences and for the law.

show abstract

“…Many questions have been raised about Rule (β). In the version used here, van Inwagen himself says that it is subject to decisive counterexample (see McKay and Johnson 1996), but he thinks that it can be patched up to avoid those problems (van Inwagen 2000). In any event, Rule (β) is not my concern here.…”

Section: The Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument

Sehon¹

2010

Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism

Cited by 157 publications

References 0 publications

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Free will in context: a contemporary philosophical perspective

A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About