In this paper, we propose an online-matching-based model to study the assignment problems arising in a wide range of online-matching markets, including online recommendations, ride-hailing platforms, and crowdsourcing markets. It features that each assignment can request a random set of resources and yield a random utility, and the two (cost and utility) can be arbitrarily correlated with each other. We present two linear-programming-based parameterized policies to study the tradeoff between the competitive ratio (CR) on the total utilities and the variance on the total number of matches (unweighted version). The first one (SAMP) is simply to sample an edge according to the distribution extracted from the clairvoyant optimal, while the second (ATT) features a time-adaptive attenuation framework that leads to an improvement over the state-of-the-art competitive-ratio result. We also consider the problem under a large-budget assumption and show that SAMP achieves asymptotically optimal performance in terms of competitive ratio.Bundle recommendations. Consider online bundle recommendations [1]. We have a ground set U of all offline items to sell. Upon the arrival of an online buyer, say j, we need to select a bundle S ⊆ U of offline items to offer to j, and then the user j will accept and reject S with certain respective probabilities, say p and 1 − p. Assume the acceptance of bundle S will yield some profit, say w j,S , to the platform (e.g., Amazon) and each type of offline item has a limited number of copies in stock. In this case, we observe that after "matching" S with j: With probability p, we will deplete a copy of all items in S and get a profit w j,S , and with probability 1 − p, it will incur no cost and no profit.Display advertising. Consider display advertising business [2,3]. We have a ground set U of all offline impressions (or ads). Upon the arrival of an online user of type j, one ads platform (e.g., Google) will display to her a set of ads, say S ⊆ U. Then, the user j will select a subset S ′ ⊆ S to click, which occurs with some probability p j,S ′ , and this yields profit w j,S ′ to the ads platform as a result. Assume each ad has a displaying capacity due to the budget of the advertiser. In this context, matching j with S will lead to a random consumption of budgets of ads in S and a random profit, and the two (consumption and profit) are positively correlated with each other.Task assignment in crowdsourcing markets. Consider task assignment problem in crowdsourcing human-resource markets [4], in which we crowdsource arriving workers to complete as many tasks as possible. We have a ground set U of offline tasks. Upon the arrival of an online worker of type j, the platform (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) assigns her a set S ⊆ U of relevant tasks, and then the worker will select a subset ⋆ This paper was accepted to the 18th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2022. PX was partially supported by NSF CRII Award IIS-1948157. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their ...