A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation

Abstract

Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari [2013]; Craver [2014]). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to-be-explained. How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need to be regular (Andersen [2012]; Sheredos [2015]). One problem of this assumption is that most mechanisms are (highly) stochastic in the sense that they 'fail more often than they succeed' (Bogen [2005]; Andersen [2012]). How can a mechanism type whose instances are more likely not to produce an instance of a particular phenomenon type be the truthmaker of the explanation of that particular phenomenon type? In this paper, I will give an answer to this question. I will analyze the notion of regularity and I will discuss Andersen's suggestion for how to cope with stochastic mechanisms. I will argue that her suggestion cannot account for all kinds of stochastic mechanisms and does not provide an answer as to why regularity grounds type-level explanation. According to my analysis, a mechanistic type-level explanation is true if and only if at least one of the following two conditions is satisfied: the mechanism brings about the phenomenon more often than any other phenomenon ('Comparative Regularity') or the phenomenon is more often brought about by the mechanism than by any other mechanism/causal sequence ('Comparative Reverse Regularity').

Intervening into mechanisms: Prospects and challenges

“…That is, we may turn to the metaphysical question of what constitution actually is . Regularity‐based accounts (e.g., Couch, ; Harbecke, , ; Krickel, forthcoming) aim to illuminate the nature of this relation building on the idea that a mechanism's components are regularly involved in its exhibiting a certain phenomenon. Still, these accounts assume that constitutive relevance is some kind of non‐causal relation.…”