A Reply to My Readers - Teresa M. Bejan: Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. 272.)

Abstract

I have focused my attention on some critical remarks Bejan introduces at the very end of the book. They in no way detract from the whole book which is indisputably a tour de force. I only wish I had more space to sing its praises.

Agree on How to Disagree: Aristotelian Ethics and Conversational Virtue

“…While demonization is dangerous, the solution is not simply avoiding “meanness” and demanding that people be “nice” to one another. Democratic politics demands that people be willing to engage in frank speech with one another, and sometimes we may need to call out others for their ideas (Bejan 2017, 64–70; Sandel 2005, 54–56). Nor can the solution involve sweeping problems under the rug: democratic politics also demands that people talk about controversial topics openly (Bejan 2017, 5; Sandel 2005, 55).…”

“…Democratic politics demands that people be willing to engage in frank speech with one another, and sometimes we may need to call out others for their ideas (Bejan 2017, 64–70; Sandel 2005, 54–56). Nor can the solution involve sweeping problems under the rug: democratic politics also demands that people talk about controversial topics openly (Bejan 2017, 5; Sandel 2005, 55). So our understanding of demonization must distinguish its deleterious effects from the constitutive components of democratic engagement.…”

“…The emphasis on forming deeper habits regarding socializing allows us to distinguish friendliness from more generic calls for “civility.” Asking people to be civil—a criticism aimed more towards rhetoric than substance—does little if anything to combat these narratives (see Bejan 2017, 144–153). If demonization is the culmination of a combative identity, then being civil merely forces people to conceal their weaponry.…”

“…Nevertheless, Bejan’s account of civility serves as a rejoinder to this discussion of demonization and conversational virtue. Bejan’s formulation, drawing primarily upon the philosophy of Roger Williams, emphasizes the importance of tolerance—specifically an actual tolerance of others compared to a merely pretended tolerance (2017, 144–145, 153, 157). However, the Aristotelian account of conversational virtue suggests a higher floor for behavior than simple tolerance.…”

“…We ought to not only allow others a space to exercise their free will and grow, but verbally reflect that space as well. However, Bejan’s account points out the potential danger of these accounts of civility: that rules for what we may and may not say—or how we may or may not say it—often involves ignoring contentious topics entirely (2017, 145–148, 150). And so we are called to be careful in how we apply these virtues and their cultivation, and recognize that we are not targeting the existence of political quarrels themselves.…”