A Reply to the Synchronist

Podgorski, Abelard

doi:10.1093/mind/fzv153

Cited by 14 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…For even if there are no diachronic norms governing what you ought to believe, there might be diachronic norms governing, say, the temporally extended process of reasoning, or evidence-gathering, or doxastic (as opposed to propositional) justification. Hlobil (2015) and Podgorski (forthcoming) argue that there may be diachronic requirements of rationality such as requirements governing the temporally extended process of reasoning, even if there are no diachronic norms governing what you ought to believe at a particular time. And even if there are no diachronic norms governing belief, there might be diachronic norms governing preferences, intentions, or actions, for instance.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A defense of objectivism about evidential support

Hedden

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one’s own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous times. Here, I defend a version of objectivism about evidential support on which facts about evidential support are grounded in facts about explanatoriness.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A defense of objectivism about evidential support

Hedden

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…Thus, it is tempting to think that the norms that determine whether a piece of reasoning (an inference) counts as good or bad would also serve as norms of diachronic rationality. This is an idea that has recently been defended by John Broome (), Ulf Hlobil (), and Abelard Podgorski () for example.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality

Valaris

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Even if you believe just what you rationally ought to believe, you may be open to rational criticism if you do so ‘for the wrong reasons’, as we say. Some have thought that this familiar observation supports the idea that there are diachronic norms of epistemic rationality – namely, norms of good reasoning. Partly drawing upon Carroll's story of Achilles and the Tortoise, this article criticises this line of thought on the grounds that it rests on a mistaken conception of inference.

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“…See alsoSouthwood (2008).8 SeeMoss (2015) andHedden (2015) for skepticism about diachronic rational requirements. (For a defense of diachronic requirements, seePodgorski (2016). )9 SeeTenenbaum (2014) and(2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

Intention Persistence

Brunero

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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There are two well‐known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persistence, due to Michael Bratman and John Broome. I argue in this paper that both formulations face serious difficulties. Bratman’s formulation is unable to accommodate two different kinds of examples in which it is permissible to drop an intention even though one’s assessment of the adequacy of its reasons remains constant. Broome’s formulation is both too weak and too strong, unable to rule out the unlicensed reconsideration of intentions, while at the same time disallowing valuable spontaneous shifts in intentions. I propose a new formulation, Intention Persistence, that avoids these difficulties and has other advantages.

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A Reply to the Synchronist

Cited by 14 publications

References 10 publications

A defense of objectivism about evidential support

A defense of objectivism about evidential support

What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality

Intention Persistence

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