A Review of Cyber–Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

You-hai, Jin; Giani, Annarita; Elasser, Ahmed; Mazumder, Sudip K.; Farnell, Chris; Mantooth, H. Alan; Kim, Taesic; Liu, Jianzhe; Chen, Bin; Seo, Gab-Su; Song, Wei; Greidanus, Mateo D. Roig; Sahoo, Subham; Blaabjerg, Frede; Zhang, Jinan; Guo, Lulu; Ahn, Bohyun; Shadmand, Mohammad B.; Gajanur, Nanditha; Abbaszada, Mohammad Ali

doi:10.1109/jestpe.2021.3111728

Cited by 77 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 134 publications

(172 reference statements)

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“…As a result, this can isolate PV inverters from the grid by tripping breakers or provoking low-voltage, high-voltage, or zero-voltage circumstances. A demonstration of a cyberattack model on PV converter, as well as the in-depth review of security assessment and countermeasures, can be viewed in [58].…”

Section: ) Cyberattack In Photovoltaic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Review of Cybersecurity in Inverter-Based Smart Power System Amid the Boom of Renewable Energy

et al. 2022

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The blossom of renewable energy worldwide and its uncertain nature have driven the need for a more intelligent power system with the deep integration of smart power electronics. The smart inverter is one of the most critical components for the optimal operation of Smart Grid. However, due to the deep information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure implementation that most inverter-based smart power systems tend to have, they are vulnerable to severe external threats such as cyberattacks by

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Section: ) Cyberattack In Photovoltaic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Review of Cybersecurity in Inverter-Based Smart Power System Amid the Boom of Renewable Energy

et al. 2022

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“…in order to maximize their impact and compromise power system operations. In the case of inverters, for example, after successfully gaining access to the DER assets, adversaries can launch cyberattacks including, i) DoS attacks compromising the inverter's availability, ii) data alteration attacks where the exchanged data between DERs and utilities are maliciously modified, and iii) command injection attacks where termination commands or malicious controls are forwarded to the inverters [30], [89]. During DoS attacks, the communication bandwidth of the inverter can be flooded leading to device disruptions, i.e., the process control flow of the device is halted [38].…”

Section: B Der Device Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Outlook: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Impacts, and Mitigations

Zografopoulos¹,

Konstantinou²,

Hatziargyriou³

2022

Preprint

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The digitalization and decentralization of the electric power grid are key thrusts towards an economically and environmentally sustainable future. Towards this goal, distributed energy resources (DER), including rooftop solar panels, battery storage, electric vehicles, etc., are becoming ubiquitous in power systems, effectively replacing fossil-fuel based generation. Power utilities benefit from DERs as they minimize transmission costs, provide voltage support through ancillary services, and reduce operational risks via their autonomous operation. Similarly, DERs grant users and aggregators control over the power they produce and consume. Apart from their sustainability and operational objectives, the cybersecurity of DER-supported power systems is of cardinal importance. DERs are interconnected, interoperable, and support remotely controllable features, thus, their cybersecurity should be thoroughly considered. DER communication dependencies and the diversity of DER architectures (e.g., hardware/software components of embedded devices, inverters, controllable loads, etc.) widen the threat surface and aggravate the cybersecurity posture of power systems. In this work, we focus on security oversights that reside in the cyber and physical layers of DERs and can jeopardize grid operations. We analyze adversarial capabilities and objectives when manipulating DER assets, and then present how protocol and device -level vulnerabilities can materialize into cyberattacks impacting power system operations. Finally, we provide mitigation strategies to thwart adversaries and directions for future DER cybersecurity.

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“…Some of the recent threats can be seen in gridtied PV inverter systems [8]- [9] and electric vehicles [10], where the attackers seized control of vital safety functions such as braking and steering in Jeep Cherokee and Tesla's model X [11]- [12]. There are many kinds of malicious attacks and infiltration techniques, including false data injection (FDI) attacks, denial of service (DoS) [13], replay attacks [14], man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [15], etc. Usually, these attacks can also be well-curated by the adversary, which can be defined as generalized FDIAs, commonly known as stealth attacks [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Projections of Cyberattacks on Stability of DC Microgrids—Modeling Principles and Solution

Leng

Sahoo

Blaabjerg

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Power Electron.

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Microgrids relying on cooperative control are supported by communications, which are highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. A significant amount of research is already carried out on the detection and mitigation of cyber attacks to secure the operation of DC microgrids. Although cyber attacks are fully capable of causing cascaded converter outages leading to full/partial system blackouts, disturbing the system stability can also be a viable target by the adversaries, which has been overlooked so far. Hence, this paper focuses on addressing the instability caused by stealth cyber attacks, which can easily bypass the well-defined observability tests. In addition, this paper also introduces a novel adaptive stabilization method to eliminate the unstable modes due to cyber attacks, which has been designed considering a previously defined cyber attack detection metric as an input. To investigate its feasibility, a detailed model of a stable DC microgrid is firstly developed. Then, considering stealth cyber attack as a non-linear element, the describing function-based method is used to investigate system stability under attack conditions. Finally, theoretical analysis, simulation and experimental results under various scenarios are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed stabilization scheme.

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A Review of Cyber–Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

Cited by 77 publications

References 134 publications

A Comprehensive Review of Cybersecurity in Inverter-Based Smart Power System Amid the Boom of Renewable Energy

A Comprehensive Review of Cybersecurity in Inverter-Based Smart Power System Amid the Boom of Renewable Energy

Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Outlook: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Impacts, and Mitigations

Projections of Cyberattacks on Stability of DC Microgrids—Modeling Principles and Solution

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