1976
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1031(76)90078-0
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A review of experiments in explicit bargaining

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Cited by 76 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, it is well documented that concession tactics that appear too reasonable (i.e., create an impression of weakness) raise the aspirations and reduce the yielding of an opponent, while patterns that appear too unreasonable often backfire and produce resistance (Komorita & Esser 1975;Siegel & Fouraker 1960;Pruitt 1981). Research indicates that concession tactics conveying a firm but reasonable impression are generally the most effective at extracting concessions from an opponent (Chertkoff & Esser 1976;Lawler & MacMurray 1980). A commonly effective way to create such an impression is a very firm initial stance in the bargaining, involving little or no yielding, followed by reciprocal concession making.…”
Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Furthermore, it is well documented that concession tactics that appear too reasonable (i.e., create an impression of weakness) raise the aspirations and reduce the yielding of an opponent, while patterns that appear too unreasonable often backfire and produce resistance (Komorita & Esser 1975;Siegel & Fouraker 1960;Pruitt 1981). Research indicates that concession tactics conveying a firm but reasonable impression are generally the most effective at extracting concessions from an opponent (Chertkoff & Esser 1976;Lawler & MacMurray 1980). A commonly effective way to create such an impression is a very firm initial stance in the bargaining, involving little or no yielding, followed by reciprocal concession making.…”
Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In explicit bargaining, a pattern or history of mutual resistance should foster mutual impressions of firmness, which prevent a unilateral initiative (all other things being equal) from being perceived as a sign of weakness and thereby avert exploitation (see relevant reviews in Chertkoff & Esser 1976;Rubin & Brown 1975;Pruitt 1981). The initial pattern of mutual hostility in the context of a consent to bargain essentially establishes conditions making unilateral initiatives potentially effective, though parties may have difficulty recognizing this potential.…”
Section: A Pattern Of Mutual Resistance and Hostility Is Established mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The research uses a fairly standard two-party laboratory setting in which subjects exchange offers on a distributive issue across a number of bargaining rounds (e.g., Chertkoff and Esser 1976). In some experiments, they also can levy punitive damage on each round (e.g., Michener and Cohen 1973).…”
Section: Overview Of Experimental Settingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An answer can be developed from a general hypothesis offered by Chertkoff and Esser (1976). In their review of this literature, Chertkoff and Esser imply that concession strategies are important primarily because of the impressions they "give off' to opponents.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Explicit bargaining is essentially what happens when adversaries reach the bargaining table. Specifically, two or more parties with conflicting interests exchange offers and counteroffers in an attempt to develop an agreement (Chertkoff & Esser, 1976). If and when conflict culminates in "explicit bargaining," parties confront a delicate tactical issue-the primary concern of this paper: What type of concession stance or strategy will produce the most yielding by an adversary?…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%