A review of game theory applications in natural disaster management research

Abstract

Research for efficiently planning and responding to natural disasters is of vital interest due to the devastating effects and losses caused by their occurrence, including economic deficiency, casualties, and infrastructure damage. Following the large breadth of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, we observe a growing use of game theoretic models in the research concerning natural disaster management. In these models, government agencies and private companies interact as players in a disaster relief game. Notable research in these areas has studied multi-player games and multi-agency collaboration, among others, to provide insights into optimal decisions concerning defensive investment and private-public partnerships in the face of disaster occurrence. This paper aims to increase the comprehension of game theory-based research in disaster management and to provide directions for future research. We analyze and integrate 57 recent papers (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016) to summarize game theory-based research in natural disaster and emergency management. We find that the response phase of disaster relief has been researched most extensively, and future research could be directed toward the other phases of disaster management such as mitigation, preparedness, and recovery. Attacker-defender games to be utilized relatively frequently to model both mitigation and response for a disaster. Defensive resource allocation and sequential/simultaneous games to model the interaction between agencies/individuals in light of a disaster are two other common ways to model disaster management. In addition to academia, the targeted audience of this research includes governments, private sectors, private citizens, and others who are concerned with or involved in disaster management.

The Role of Coordination, Decision Making and Special Data Infrastructure on the Disaster Management in Pakistan: Moderating Role of Information System

“…After the initial crisis is over, it often continues to be weak. Disaster recovery includes rebuilding infrastructure, health care, and rehabilitation, development activities, and policies or practices to avoid situations in the future (Seaberg, Devine, & Zhuang, 2017).…”

Public-private collaborations in emergency logistics: A framework based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts

“…Game-theory formally describes the effects and interdependencies of strategic decision makers (Myerson, 1991;Rasmusen, 2007). Similar to Seaberg et al (2017), we argue that in the context of disaster management partners act strategically as long as their goals are not completely congruent. Although the number of articles in the area of disaster management is limited, there are some first contributions that analyze the strategic interaction among different actors in this domain, though not from a public-private perspective.…”

A Stochastic Disaster Relief Game Theory Network Model

“…However, [36] in their survey of game theory and humanitarian operations noted that the associated literature has been limited. Seaberg, Devine, and Zhuang [61], more recently, reviewed 57 papers from 2006 to 2016 on disaster management and game theory and noted that the response phase of disaster management had been the phase researched the most intensively. Coles, Zhang, and Zhuang [9] in their recent, novel work investigate how non-cooperative game theory can be utilized to assist different agencies, such as businesses, government agencies, militaries, and nonprofit organizations, in better decision-making as to partnership selection during the disaster response and recovery phases.…”