This paper considers actuarial science within the context of the framework provided by the formal study of scientific method. A review of key points of recent developments within the methodology (study of method) of science and the methodology of economics is presented. A characterisation of actuarial science and its methods is then developed using as inputs the United Kingdom actuarial education syllabus and recent work of the profession, most notably Bell et al. (1998). The methods of actuarial science are then considered within the framework provided by formal methodology to propose an articulation of the methodology of actuarial science. This methodology is explored in relation to that of other sciences, and some of the implications and opportunities for actuarial science which arise from this investigation are identified. The paper concludes that actuarial science has a distinctive and potentially powerful empirical method of applied approximation. This methodological analysis is intended, in part, to add to the momentum of the programme concerned with furthering the use of actuarial methods within broader spheres (e.g. Nowell el al., 1996).
More recent developments in empiricismDespite the collapse of positivism, the strict empiricist tradition continues to be a substantial strand of thought within contemporary philosophy of science (e.g. Van Fraassen, 1980;Sneed, 1979).
Sociology of Science2.3.1 The 1960s saw the rapid rise of philosophical thinking that rejected the search for a rational basis of science, and focused, instead, on the existing practices of scientists and the historic development of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970), first published in 1962, is probably the most influential book within the philosophy of science published within the second half of the twentieth century.
Thomas Kuhn2.3.2.1 Kuhn rejects the notion that the philosophy of science should be concerned with the search for unique methodological prescriptions for how science should be undertaken. He regards the empirical basis of science as necessary, but not sufficient, for determining scientific beliefs. Rather, theory choice is driven, in part, by the norms of the scientific community within which the scientist is working. These norms are, in part, a function of historic accidents, and change over time to provide a varying context for the activity of the scientific community. Moreover, exploration of the historic development of scientific knowledge suggested to Kuhn that these norms were, in the various areas of scientific study, subject to sudden periodic step changes.2.3.2.2 From this account of the historic development of science Kuhn developed the concept of a 'paradigm', i.e. some agreement amongst a scientific community concerning theory and its application which provides a stable framework within which a coherent tradition of scientific research develops. Work in the paradigm is 'normal science' -it does not challenge the agreed framework which defines the paradigm. Thi...