A risk and threat assessment approaches overview in autonomous systems of systems

Abstract

Systems of systems (SoS) have been introduced in early 1990s in air traffic control domain, defense and information technologies. Systems like this contain a set of components, being systems itself, with constituent components retaining operational independence. The definition and configuration of SoS have evolutionary nature and emergent behavior is one of the many important characteristics to be mentioned. Over the past ten years fast technological and industrial advances in the domain of autonomous and cooperating systems started to occur, which created new opportunities to use the benefits of SoS. In the near future, fully autonomous and cooperating systems are expected to become our reality and increase the production efficiency, while decreasing the human effort in harmful environments. There exist the need to make sure that critical properties of SoS, such as safety and security are guaranteed as a joint effort, since it is not sufficient anymore to address these properties independently in the development process. In this paper an overview of the most common approaches and methods used to provide reasoning about joint safety and security is provided, as well as a check of the latest updates in standards related to these properties.

Contract-based methods and activities in the validation of interfaces for System of Systems

“…Using contracts for interfaces in SoS can be extended by considering more methods and activities. Further research should address safety and security within the CSs and interfaces which impact the whole SoS performance (c f. [41]). Additionally the validation environments should be part of an integrated, continuous and flexible validation of models.…”

Timing Predictability and Security in Safety-Critical Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems: A Position Paper

“…Safety and security are interconnected and can influence each other; there is a recognised need to consider them jointly [40]. A connected safety-critical CPS, cannot be argued as being acceptably safe unless security impact on safety is considered [41].…”