Infotech@Aerospace 2011 2011
DOI: 10.2514/6.2011-1424
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A Risk Based Paradigm and Model for Unmanned Aerial Systems in the National Airspace

Abstract: A major focus of current unmanned systems operations is assessing the inherent risk associated with a mission. Efforts to integrate unmanned systems into the national airspace require manufacturers be able to calculate the risk of a mission in terms of human safety. Threats to human safety from midair collisions and ground strikes are the focus of the risk model. The projects intent is to assist in determining applications that leverage the strengths of current unmanned aircraft technology while mitigating the… Show more

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Cited by 65 publications
(53 citation statements)
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“…As such it is widely assumed that the probability of an accident given the occurrence of the MAC State is one (i.e., P Accident|MAC = 1). This same assumption has been made when modelling the risk of MAC for UAS (Lum and Waggoner, 2011;Weibel and Hansman, 2004). For many types of UA this is an overly conservative assumption to make as there are a number of potential controls that can be implemented to reduce the probability that an accident results given the occurrence of a MAC.…”
Section: Mitigative Mid-air Collision Controlsmentioning
confidence: 91%
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“…As such it is widely assumed that the probability of an accident given the occurrence of the MAC State is one (i.e., P Accident|MAC = 1). This same assumption has been made when modelling the risk of MAC for UAS (Lum and Waggoner, 2011;Weibel and Hansman, 2004). For many types of UA this is an overly conservative assumption to make as there are a number of potential controls that can be implemented to reduce the probability that an accident results given the occurrence of a MAC.…”
Section: Mitigative Mid-air Collision Controlsmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…A safety case provides the ''documented body of evidence'' (CAA-UK, 2010) necessary to demonstrate that the risk of a MAC accident has been managed to an acceptable level (i.e., meets the specified ''safety-target''). To date, research has focussed on the modelling of the risk (e.g., references Dalamagkidis et al (2009), FAA (2009), Kochenderfer et al (2010), Lum and Waggoner (2011), Melnyk (2013), NATO (2008) and Weibel and Hansman (2004)) and on the analysis of specific risk controls (e.g., DAA (EUROCONTROL, 2010b;NATO, 2008;Prats et al, 2012)) at the expense of the more foundational problem of how a safety case for UA operations in non-segregated airspace should be structured and evaluated. Haddon and Whittaker (2002) identify a number of challenges in a regulation by ''safety-target'' approach.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However Lum and Waggoner (2011) suggest that these rates are overly pessimistic as they account for more than just crashes, so they suggest 1.0 per 1,000 FH (0.001 accidents/FH) is a more reasonable assumption and use this number in their safety risk model. The accident rate is not the MAC rate.…”
Section: Model Calibrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Military organizations around the world have been using them increasingly for the last 10 years (Lum & Waggoner, 2011). In the United States, from 2005 to 2011, the increase in UAV usage is approximately six-fold; about 100,000 flight hours to 600,000 in the Department of Defense (DOD).…”
Section: A Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%