A Scalable Extension of Group Key Management Protocol

Abstract

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. ABSTRACT This paper presents a robust, scalable extension to the recently proposed multicast Group Key Management Protocol GKMP 1 , 2 , in terms of security administration. The GKMP has two major security related problems, a lack of any mechanism to remove a compromised group administrator, b lack of scalability. We are able to remove a compromised single panel member from generating the group keys by setting the panel members with shared authority to generate the group keys. We then introduce the sub-controllers who have all the functionalities of the group control panel except the authority to generate the group keys. The subcontrol panel helps scalability of the network in terms of the security operations. The sub-controllers are chosen using a threshold based clustering algorithm.

A Distributed Shared Key Generation Procedure Using Fractional Keys

“…The initiator member 1 then decrypts it and performs n = 1 , and then sends 1 to each member i, f o r i = 2 ; : : : n , a s 1 ,! i : ffT 1 ; I ; 1; 1 g K , 1 1 g Ki : 5. Each member i privately computes i;1 = 1 i;1 , and uses i;1 as its initial pad.…”

A distributed shared key generation procedure using fractional keys

“…One may be tempted to suggest that a single trust level can be defined by choosing the lowest possible trust level as the group trust level. Though such a straightforward approach is feasible, one can do better by compartmentalizing the group based on local trust levels [5]. Such a compartmentalization inevitably leads to clustering of a given group.…”

“…Such a compartmentalization inevitably leads to clustering of a given group. Compartmentalization also helps in having a better control over the set of key management and distribution functionalities as noted in [5]. While the entities in each cluster may share a common trust level, it may be that the clusters are mutually suspicious and have only partial trust in each other.…”

“…This means that group members must place complete trust in this group member. In [5], a panel of members are allowed to generate the keys. However, [5] does not present any explicit distributed key generation scheme.…”