A Security Design for a Wide-Area Distributed System

Leiwo, Jussipekka; Hänle, Christoph; Homburg, Philip; Gamage, Chandana; Tanenbaum, Andrew S.

doi:10.1007/10719994_19

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Because security was not covered in the original Globe design, no interfaces are defined for the security subobject. A preliminary security design evalua-tion [128] suggests providing two additional security interfaces-secComm and secRepl-for interaction with the communication and replication subobjects.…”

Section: Security Subobject Interfacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and implementation of a secure wide-area object middleware

et al. 2007

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This work was carried out in the ASCI graduate school. ASCI dissertation series number 150. Doctoral committee: prof.dr. A.S. Tanenbaum (promotor) dr. B. Crispo (copromotor) prof.dr. B. Christianson (University of Hertfordshire, UK) prof.dr. J. Bacon (University of Cambridge, UK) prof.dr. F. Brazier (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam) prof.dr. M. van Steen (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam) dr. H. Bos (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam)

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Section: Security Subobject Interfacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and implementation of a secure wide-area object middleware

et al. 2007

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“…The security subobject [8] is responsible for enforcing the object's security policy at the local representative level. This is done by having the security subobject mediating the communication flow between the other local subobjects.…”

Section: Ai A2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Access Control, Reverse Access Control and Replication Control in a World Wide Distributed System

Popescu

Gamage²,

Tanenbaum

2002

Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security

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In this paper we examine several access control problems that occur in an objectbased distributed system that permits objects to be replicated on multiple machines. First, there is the classical access control problem, which relates to which users can execute which methods. Second, we identified a reverse access control problem, which concerns which replicas can execute which methods for authorized users. Finally, there is the issue of how updates are propagated securely from replica to replica. Our solution uses roles and preserves the scalability needed in a worldwide distributed system.

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“…The control subobject's job is to take care of invocations from client processes on the host where the local object resides and to mediate the interaction between the semantics subobject and the replication subobject. It is comparable to a skeleton stub in object adaptors [24] The security subobject [17] is responsible for enforcing the DSO's security policy at the level of local objects by mediating the communication flow between the other local subobjects.…”

Section: The Globe Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, in the third step, selected measures are to be implemented and evaluated. The first stage has been already completed, and the resulting document [17] can be seen as a specification of all security functions that could be incorporated in Globe applications. This paper deals with the second stage, and we are using it as a specification document for our prototype implementation.…”

Section: Security Issues In Globementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example there is the threat of malicious insiders (replicas running on malicious Globe object servers) which introduces the need to restrict the functionality of replicas depending on the trustworthiness of the system they are running on. Looking at the wide range of security problems identified in [17], we decided to group the security issues relevant to our design into three categories: secure binding, platform security and secure method invocation.…”

Section: Security Issues In Globementioning

confidence: 99%

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A security architecture for object-based distributed systems

Popescu

Steen

Tanenbaum

18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings.

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Large-scale distributed systems present numerous security problems not present in local systems. In this paper we present a general security architecture for a large-scale object-based distributed system. Its main features include ways for servers to authenticate clients, clients to authenticate servers, new secure servers to be instantiated without manual intervention, and ways to restrict which client can perform which operation on which object. All of these features are done in a platform-and application-independent way, so the results are quite general. The basic idea behind the scheme is to have each object owner issue cryptographically sealed certificates to users to prove which operations they may request and to servers to prove which operations they are authorized to execute. These certificates are used to ensure secure binding and secure method invocation. The paper discusses the required certificates and security protocols for using them.

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A Security Design for a Wide-Area Distributed System

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Design and implementation of a secure wide-area object middleware

Design and implementation of a secure wide-area object middleware

Access Control, Reverse Access Control and Replication Control in a World Wide Distributed System

A security architecture for object-based distributed systems

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