A Security Reference Model for Autonomous Vehicles in Military Operations

Mancini, Federico; Bruvoll, Solveig; Melrose, J. R.; Leve, Frederick A.; Mailloux, Logan O.; Ernst, Raphael; Rein, Kellyn; Fioravanti, Stefano; Merani, Diego; Been, Robert

doi:10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162227

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Thus, the value assigned to the assets as discussed in the previous section, can be directly used to inform the risk process at system level. As for the threat and vulnerability components of risk, they are not in the scope of the paper, but we use a threat assessment model developed specifically for unmanned and autonomous military vehicles Mancini et al (2021); Mancini, F. et al (2023) to support the case study in Section 5. For other types of ICT systems there exist other models and threat catalogs that can be used.…”

Section: Risk and Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Pragmatic Mission-Centric Approach to ICT Risk and Security -- Autonomous Vehicles as a Case

Mancini

2023

Proceeding of the 33rd European Safety and Reliability Conference

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Cyber security in the military domain has long been characterized by the focus on data confidentiality protection through strong system isolation and cryptography. Current warfare is more and more dependent on quick and distributed access to information, both from open and closed sources. In this setting, too much focus on reducing the risk of data leakage may lead to security solutions that, in practice, hinder access to critical information and thus reduce the actual operative effect of the Armed Forces. Additionally, as most military platforms are becoming more digitalized and interconnected, availability and integrity of steering systems should also be taking into account when securing cyber-physical systems, irrespective of their classification. This article discusses the challenge of how to integrate these concerns in a comprehensive risk management approach where trade-offs between competing security needs can be analyzed in a more systematic and traceable way.

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Section: Risk and Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Pragmatic Mission-Centric Approach to ICT Risk and Security -- Autonomous Vehicles as a Case

Mancini

2023

Proceeding of the 33rd European Safety and Reliability Conference

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“…Research such as [33][34][35][36][37] has paid great attention to influence and acceptance factors. In contrast, [8,[38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46] have focused on cybersecurity challenges and evaluations. Drawing parallelism from cybersecurity, risk assessment, security management techniques, security impacts and effects, and threat analysis has been beneficial for quantifying security.…”

Section: Two-factor Authentication (2fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Aware Cybersecurity Architecture for Autonomous Vehicles: Security through System-Level Accountability

Adu-Kyere,

Nigussie,

Isoaho

2023

Sensors

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The inherent dynamism of recent technological advancements in intelligent vehicles has seen multitudes of noteworthy security concerns regarding interactions and data. As future mobility embraces the concept of vehicles-to-everything, it exacerbates security complexities and challenges concerning dynamism, adaptiveness, and self-awareness. It calls for a transition from security measures relying on static approaches and implementations. Therefore, to address this transition, this work proposes a hierarchical self-aware security architecture that effectively establishes accountability at the system level and further illustrates why such a proposed security architecture is relevant to intelligent vehicles. The article provides (1) a comprehensive understanding of the self-aware security concept, with emphasis on its hierarchical security architecture that enables system-level accountability, and (2) a deep dive into each layer supported by algorithms and a security-specific in-vehicle black box with external virtual security operation center (VSOC) interactions. In contrast to the present in-vehicle security measures, this architecture introduces characteristics and properties that enact self-awareness through system-level accountability. It implements hierarchical layers that enable real-time monitoring, analysis, decision-making, and in-vehicle and remote site integration regarding security-related decisions and activities.

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“…Most of Tor's tasks involve collecting, processing, storing and communicating data. In this sense, it is exposed to many of the same threats found in well-established catalogues 2 . The main difference from a pure information system, is that these tasks are performed while navigating through a demanding environment.…”

Section: A Catalogue Of Threats and Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent studies provide a first overview of relevant threats and necessary security capabilities [1], [2], among which is the ability to autonomously detect attacks or malfunctions and react in a way that minimises the consequences for the mission: a fully autonomous cyber defence capability. The reason is that advanced autonomous vehicles will likely be employed in missions where it is not possible to remote control or monitor the system for extended periods of times, and potential compromises must be handled locally and autonomously.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards data-driven autonomous cyber defence for military unmanned vehicles - threats & attacks

Kaasen

Grov

Mancini

et al. 2022

MILCOM 2022 - 2022 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)

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Unmanned vehicles with varying degrees of autonomy will likely change the way military operations can be conducted, but they also introduce risks that require new ways of thinking security. In particular, the safety ramifications of cyber attacks should be seen as equally critical as the loss of classified data. Developing a cyber defence capability that can detect and manage these potentially harmful events also without human intervention thus becomes a fundamental requirement. In this paper, we commence such work by exploring how to disrupt the functionality of an actual military unmanned ground vehicle given an internal attacker, and how the resulting data can be used to design an an effective detection capability.

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A Security Reference Model for Autonomous Vehicles in Military Operations

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

A Pragmatic Mission-Centric Approach to ICT Risk and Security -- Autonomous Vehicles as a Case

A Pragmatic Mission-Centric Approach to ICT Risk and Security -- Autonomous Vehicles as a Case

Self-Aware Cybersecurity Architecture for Autonomous Vehicles: Security through System-Level Accountability

Towards data-driven autonomous cyber defence for military unmanned vehicles - threats & attacks

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