A Security Scheme of 5G Ultradense Network Based on the Implicit Certificate

Abstract

The ultradense network (UDN) is one of the most promising technologies in the fifth generation (5G) to address the network system capacity issue. It can enhance spatial reuse through the flexible, intensive deployment of small base stations. A universal 5G UDN architecture is necessary to realize the autonomous and dynamic deployment of small base stations. However, the security of the 5G UDN is still in its infancy, and the data communication security among the network entities is facing new challenges. In this paper, we proposed a new security based on implicit certificate (IC) scheme; the scheme solves the security problem among the access points (APs) in a dynamic APs group (APG) and between the AP and user equipment (UE). We present each phase regarding how two network entities obtain the Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificate scheme, verify each other's identity, and share keys in an UDN. Finally, we extensively analyze our lightweight security communication model in terms of security and performance. The simulation on network bandwidth evaluation is also conducted to prove the efficiency of the solution.the distance between the user equipment (UE) and the network entities and greatly improves the spectrum efficiency. Meanwhile, the UDN has been identified as a constituent of future 5G core technologies by the IMT-2020 expert group [3]. With various small base stations acting as access points (APs), the intersite distance (ISD) decreases as the network entities' density increases. The AP of 5G is different from the traditional macro station. Traditional macro stations are regularly deployed by operators, while AP deployment may be irregular or even deployed by users. Pseudo or malicious AP will threaten 5G system security. What is more, the APs are not just an air network link; they will cooperate with each other to serve user in UDN. In the air transmission of UDN, the unprotected data among the APs is easy to intercept. Therefore, the mutual authentication and the secure data communication among the dense APs, including the keys for the sessions, will face new challenges.As the wireless access network of the 5G, the UDN adopts a different deployment plan that focuses on the new requirement of "network follows user" and supports higher date transmission rates and multiple services. This must fully

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