A semantic analysis of conditional logic1

Stalnaker, Robert; Thomason, Richmond H.

doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00408.x

Cited by 181 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The problem that this article deals with is that a standard minimal change semantics for counterfactuals (Stalnaker, 1968;Stalnaker and Thomason, 1970;Lewis, 1973) fails to capture this intuition: if the usual boolean semantics for or is assumed, a standard minimal change semantics for counterfactuals predicts the counterfactual in (1) to be true.…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterfactuals, correlatives, and disjunction

Alonso-Ovalle

2009

Linguist and Philos

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Abstract. The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill 1975, Nute 1975, Fine 1977, Ellis et al. 1977).This paper argues that the failure to capture the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals provides no reason to abandon a minimal change semantics. It shows that the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals is expected once we refine our assumptions about the semantics of or and the logical form of conditionals, and (i) we assume

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Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterfactuals, correlatives, and disjunction

Alonso-Ovalle

2009

Linguist and Philos

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“…Relying on accounts of counterfactual conditionals in terms of possible worlds has, by now, a long history, with the important papers of Stalnaker 1968, Stalnaker andThomason 1970, and Lewis's influential 1973 book helping to make this approach to counterfactuals close to orthodox. I will adopt some of the details of Lewis's specific proposal.…”

Section: Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Counterfactuals and Impossible Worlds

Nolan¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This paper is not directly in the service of either of the ambitious analytic projects of analysing causation in terms of the holding of certain counterfactuals, nor of analysing counterfactuals in terms of causal matters. It focuses instead on one of the traditional puzzles that connect the two that arise almost whatever one takes the connection between counterfactuals and causation to be. The puzzle has no neat label that I am aware of, but it arises in its clearest form when we consider counterfactuals involving antecedent states that involve a difference from the actual course of events at a particular time, and a consequent, at least in part involving a state somewhat later than the time of the antecedent difference. In the possible worlds framework, the puzzle is often put in terms of what other differences there in the relevant possible worlds where the antecedent is true. Do those worlds match ours with respect to nearly all their pasts until the time relevant to the antecedent? Do they require 'small miracles' relative to the laws of the actual world? Is their causal structure the same except for an 'intervention' on a state associated with the antecedent? . . . and so on. Let me label this problem the 'deviation problem' to suggest that it concerns what deviations from actuality would be required for the antecedent to be true, in the class of counterfactuals of interest.In this paper I will propose a novel solution to the deviation problem. This solution will have several signal advantages over a number of the better-known proposed solutions to this problem, though it also incurs some distinctive costs. I am not sure, then, whether something like it will turn out to be the best solution, though I am sure it deserves a run for its money alongside its better-

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“…Stalnaker has never tried to solve this problem. He thought that 10 Stalnaker 1968, Stalnaker and Thomason 1970. 11 Cf.…”

Section: Background 2: Goodman's Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transition periods and miracles

Djordjević¹,

Ostojić²

2015

Belgr Philosop Ann

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A counterfactual conditional "If it were the case that A it would be the case that C", where A and C are false propositions claiming that some events a and c (respectively) occurred, is true at the actual world according to Lewis's theory iff C is true at certain possible worlds. These worlds have the same history as our world up to a time shortly before a, when there occurred a so-called small miracle, which led to A being true. The theory says that there is a transition period between the occurrence of the small miracle and the event a. Our point in this paper is that transition periods and small miracles are notions Lewis could do without. We will argue that they lead to problems, and we will suggest a way his theory could work without them.Small miracles are part of Lewis's philosophical system. Our paper begins with explaining the role that this part plays in the system and puts it in the context of the questions Lewis deals with. This includes an explanation of the method Lewis developed to determine the similarity relation, which led him to the notions of small miracles and the transition period. We try to show, first, that the very same method does not favour the worlds with the transition period 1 We would like to thank Miloš Arsenijević and Milan Jovanović for encouragement and helpful discussions. Our first plan was to write a joint paper with Milan Jovanović, but he left us to take a job in another city. We benefited form discussions with him especially about the transition period problems.

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A semantic analysis of conditional logic1

Cited by 181 publications

References 12 publications

Counterfactuals, correlatives, and disjunction

Counterfactuals, correlatives, and disjunction

Causal Counterfactuals and Impossible Worlds

Transition periods and miracles

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