A short certificateless aggregate signature against coalition attacks

Abstract

Certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) is a crucial cryptosystem. It can not only compress multiple signatures into a short signature, but also ensure the validity of each signature participating in the aggregation by verifying the validity of an resulting aggregate signature. Therefore, a secure and efficient CLAS scheme is very useful for resource-constrained environments because it greatly reduces the overall length of the signature and the verifier’s computational overhead. Cheng et al. presented an efficient CLAS scheme and proved its security in the random oracle model. However, we find that their scheme has security flaws. In this paper, we demonstrate that Cheng et al.’s CLAS scheme is vulnerable to coalition attacks from internal signers. To overcome these attacks, we present an improved CLAS scheme and prove that it is existentially unforgeable under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In addition, our CLAS scheme can not only resist coalition attacks but also generate a very short aggregate signature. The performance analysis results show that our improved CLAS scheme is lower than the related CLAS schemes in terms of communication overhead and computation cost.

On the security of privacy‐preserving authentication scheme with full aggregation in vehicular ad hoc network

“…Unfortunately, Du et al showed that the scheme in Reference is insecure against forgery attack by a type I adversary. Yang et al put forward a short CLAS scheme based on bilinear pairing which can withstand coalition attacks. An unrestricted CLAS scheme with full aggregation was proposed in Reference .…”