A simple model to bridge Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity

Abstract

Triggered by the article titled “The tragedy of the commons” by Hardin, a collectively‐managed resource (CMR) emerges and becomes a highly fruitful discussion topic. Furthermore, Ostrom augments the topic and demonstrates that the utilization of a CMR should not always result in a tragedy. However, the theory used to justify Hardin's tragedy differs from the one used to justify Ostrom's comity; Hardin's tragedy is justified by one‐shot prisoners' dilemma (PD), while Ostrom's comity is justified by infinitely repeated PD. The discussion in this study shows that Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity can be supported by the same theory. An infinitely repeated PD complemented with a likelihood of making an error is used to reach the conclusion that the occurrences of Hardin's tragedy and Ostrom's comity are just a matter of probability. Recommendations for Resource Managers To avoid as far as possible placing divisible resources under the common property regime. To develop effective monitoring systems for resource management under the common property regime to stop deviations as early as possible. To facilitate resource users involved in resource utilization under the common property regime to meet and to communicate regularly to increase mutual trust.

Sustaining the urban commons in Ghana through decentralized planning

“…When misplaced political interest is placed ahead of policies and regulations of the commons, sustainability is threatened. Regular interactions amongst resource users are important in the effective management of commons [ 51 , 52 ], but they hardly exist in the urban settings of Ghana, which are large geographical areas with a large number of people who hardly get time to meet and discuss issues that affect them [ 107 ]. Urban poverty is also prevalent [ 108 ], and so, everyone is seeking ways and means to make ends meet, whether or not their actions and inactions have negative outcomes on the sustainability of the urban commons.…”

“…However, to achieve effective self-organization, Foster and Iaione [ 1 ], and Frischmann et al [ 50 ] recommend the existence of institutional arrangements to regulate the benefit-sharing emanating from the resource system for the collective good. In an analysis of Hardin's perspective in relation to Ostrom's, Soedomo [ 51 ] concluded that their respective perspectives could be supported by the same theory. Also, both Soedomo [ 51 ] and Ostrom [ 52 ] have recommended effective monitoring of commons as well as the creation of platforms for resource users to regularly interact to increase mutual trust.…”

“…In an analysis of Hardin's perspective in relation to Ostrom's, Soedomo [ 51 ] concluded that their respective perspectives could be supported by the same theory. Also, both Soedomo [ 51 ] and Ostrom [ 52 ] have recommended effective monitoring of commons as well as the creation of platforms for resource users to regularly interact to increase mutual trust.…”