We discuss selected technical capabilities needed to apply the DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reprocessing plant. We are chiefly concerned with the measurements needed to close the mass balance around the process line and the analysis methods for assessing the results. Process conditions at the Tokai plant were used when numerical values were needed to assist the analysis. A rationale is presented for the selection of instruments (x-ray fluorescence spectrometers, x-ray densitometers, and gamma-ray spectrometers) best suited to establishing plutonium concentrations and, ultimately, inventories in the feed tanks. The current state of the art in estimating inventory in contactors is reviewed and profitable directions for further work are recommended. A generalized performance surface has been developed that can measure the diversion sensitivity of the safeguard system when the instrument performance levels, the number of measurements made, and the false alarm probability are specified. An analysis of its application to the Tokai plant is given. Finally, a conceptual approach to the problem of IAEA safeguards verification is discussed. It appears possible that, in the process of verifying, the full power of the plant operator's safeguard system can be brought to the service of the IAEA.